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STILL MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM: PREDATORY LENDING,
PREEMPTION, AND FEDERALLY-SUPPORTED LENDERS

This article discusses the continuing problem of predatory lending abuses in the subprime
home mortgage lending market and federal and state attempts to address the problem. Over the
protests of consumer advocates, federal agencies have recently issued regulations preempting
state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and thrifts. In addition, Congress is
considering legislation that would preempt state predatory lending laws for all lenders. The
article considers the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally-supported
lenders–banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Banks and thrifts receive support through the federal safety net, which includes
deposit insurance. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally chartered, privately-owned
corporations that receive other types of federal support. The article concludes that preemption is
not warranted for national banks and thrifts or for other lenders, and that banks, thrifts, and the
GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory lending problem by originating, purchasing,
and/or securitizing subprime loans in compliance with state and federal law.
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Citigroup is the largest financial services company in the world.1 Its retail banking
group, operating under the name Citibank, includes a number of national banks with federal
charters.2 Citigroup and Citibank are affiliated with a subprime lender3 who has engaged in
predatory mortgage lending practices.
Associates First Capital was notorious for its predatory lending practices in 2000 when
Citigroup purchased the company.4 Associates was at the time under investigation by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Department “as epitomizing ‘predatory’ tactics
that strip away equity in homes of unsophisticated borrowers by making loans with deceptive
terms and fees.”5 Associates’ practices included making loans with high interest rates, large
upfront fees, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties as well as aggressively selling single1

See HOOVER’S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, Citigroup Inc. (Sept. 7, 2005), available
at 2005 WLNR 14057524.
2

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks Active As of 9/30/05, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblist_Name_St_City_BankNet.pdf.
3

Subprime lenders are lenders who make subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers
with a higher credit risk. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a more extensive
discussion of subprime lending.
4

See Richard A. Oppel & Patrick McGeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying
Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, at 31 [hereinafter Citigroup Buying Trouble]; Richard A.
Oppel & Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup Revamps Lending Unit To Avoid Abusive Practices,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Citigroup Revamps]. Martin Eakes, the founder of
a nonprofit community lender in North Carolina, is quoted as saying, “It’s simply unacceptable
to have the largest bank in America take over the icon of predatory lending.” Citigroup Buying
Trouble, supra, at 31. See also infra Part V.A (discussing the involvement of bank affiliates in
predatory lending).
In 1996, Associates had purchased Fleet Finance, another notorious predatory lender.
See Tony Munroe, Fleet Unloads Finance Unit, BOSTON HERALD, July 2, 1996. In 1993 and
1994 Fleet Finance had paid over $100 million in settlement of allegations that it had engaged in
predatory lending practices in Georgia. Id.
5

See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.
3

premium credit insurance and “flipping,” or refinancing, loans to generate additional fees
without benefit to the borrower.6 Employees of Associates were under intense pressure to sell
credit life insurance, and a subsidiary had collected $900 million in revenue from credit
insurance premiums over the five years prior to the Citigroup purchase, selling credit insurance
on fifty-seven percent of its real estate loans one year.7 Consistent with its practice of “flipping”
loans, Associates even refinanced zero-interest loans made through Habitat for Humanity.8
Citigroup promised reforms, but its consumer finance company, Citifinancial, which would
eventually take over the Associates branches, planned to continue charging prepayment
penalties, selling single premium credit life insurance, and requiring mandatory arbitration
clauses in its loans.9
In March 2001, the FTC sued Associates, as well as Citigroup and Citifinancial as its
successors, alleging that Associates had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act by engaging
in deceptive practices to induce consumers to purchase credit insurance and to refinance existing
home mortgage loans into new high interest rate loans with high fees.10 At the time, Citigroup
stressed its commitment to resolve problems and implement changes in the former Associates

6

See Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra note 4, at 31. See also supra Part I (describing the
practice of predatory lending).
7

See id.

8

See id.

9

See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.

10

See Federal Trade Commission, News Release, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges Against
the Associates: Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.htm [hereinafter FTC News Release].
4

branches.11 In September 2002, Citigroup reached a settlement with the FTC, agreeing to pay
$215 million to customers of Associates who had purchased credit insurance between December
1, 1995, and November 30, 2000,12 the date on which Citigroup finalized its purchase of
Associates.13 The settlement was made contingent on approval of the settlement of a class action
in California providing for payment of an additional $25 million to consumers who refinanced
with Associates during the same time period.14 The settlement was the largest ever reached by
the FTC.15
Through the pendency of the FTC suit and after the settlement, Citigroup continued to
insist that the problems were with the old Associates and that it was instituting reforms.16
However, in May 2004, the Federal Reserve ordered Citifinancial to pay a $70 million penalty
for lending abuses which occurred in 2000 and 2001.17 The Fed asserted that Citifinancial made
home equity loans without adequately determining the ability of borrowers to repay the loans.18
The penalty was the largest ever assessed by the Federal Reserve for violations of consumer
11

See Richard A Oppel, U.S. Suit Cites Citigroup Unit On Loan Deceit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2001, at A1.
12

See FTC News Release, supra note 10.

13

See Citigroup Closes Associates Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12.

14

See FTC News Release, supra note 10.

15

See id.

16

Citigroup stopped doing business with about 20 percent of the brokers who brought
business to Associates, Richard A Oppel, Citigroup Takes Action Against Brokers at Consumer
Loan Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at C1, and agreed to stop selling single-premium credit
insurance, opting instead to allow borrowers to pay monthly premiums, Patrick McGeehan,
Citigroup Set to End Tactic on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at C1.
17

See Timothy L. O’Brien, Fed Assesses Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Fed Assesses Citigroup].
5

lending laws.19 More recently, Citigroup disclosed that it had made hundreds of high-cost loans
even after adopting a policy of no longer making high-cost loans.20 The New York attorney
general is investigating whether Citigroup made high-cost loans to minority and other vulnerable
homeowners who could qualify for lower cost loans.21
Citibank is not the only bank affiliated with a subprime lender accused of predatory
lending abuses. In 2002, Household International, an affiliate of HSBC Bank USA,22 agreed to
pay $484 million to settle allegations by states that it had engaged in predatory lending
practices.23 In addition, Bank of America, Bank One, Chase, Fleet Bank, and Wells Fargo, or
affiliates of these banks, have all been sued based on allegations of predatory lending abuses.24

18

See Fed Assesses Citigroup, supra note 17, at C1.

19

See id.

20

See Eric Dash, Citigroup Units Kept Making Loans That Violated Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2005, at C9 [hereinafter Citigroup Violated Policy]. The high-cost loans covered by
Citigroup’s policy are defined in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15
U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (2000).
21

See Citigroup Violated Policy, supra note 20, at C1.

22

See HOOVER’S IN-DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS, HSBC USA Inc. (Oct. 5, 2005), available
at 2005 WLNR 16118527.
23

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-04-280, CONSUMER
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY
LENDING, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AGING, U.S. SENATE 4 (2004) , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
24

See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Federation of
America, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and U.S. Public Interest Research
Group to Office of Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Docket No. 03-16 (Oct. 6, 2003),
available at http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/test_and_comm/10_6_occ.shtml [hereinafter NCLC
Comments]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s
Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,
23 ANN REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 315 (2004).
6

Home ownership is still the American dream,25 and more Americans than ever are
realizing that dream.26 Predatory lending practices and the foreclosures that result, however,
undermine that dream. The federal government has played and continues to play a significant
role in promoting home ownership by supporting the home mortgage market, by offering tax
incentives to homeowners, by attempting to make home mortgage financing more available and
less expensive.27 Some of the government’s efforts to benefit home mortgage lenders and
support the mortgage market, however, harm the very homeowners that they are ultimately
intended to benefit.28 Recently, the federal government is thwarting the efforts of state
legislators to protect homeowners in their states by preempting state statutes regulating predatory
lending abuses. Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes applicable to national
banks and savings associations (also called thrifts), and proposed legislation would preempt the
statutes altogether.
25

See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Homeownership is a
National Priority, at http://www.hud.gov/initiatives/homeownership/index.cfm. See also Joan
Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the
American obsession with homeownership).
26

See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT & U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 13 (June 2000), available at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD/TREASURY JOINT
REPORT] (stating that 67.1 percent of American families own a home).
27

See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation
of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 394
(1994).
28

Federal law encourages both borrowers and lenders to structure consumer debt as a
home equity loan secured by the borrower’s home. Furthermore, federal law preempts state
usury laws and laws governing alternative mortgage transactions, thus permitting high interest
rates and other unfair terms in home equity loans despite state law to the contrary. Finally,
federal bankruptcy law, which otherwise could give some relief to debtors, requires a debtor to
pay a home equity loan in full on its original terms to avoid foreclosure. See id. at 432-35.
7

In this article I address the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federallysupported lenders–banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.29 I conclude that preemption is not warranted, even for national banks and
thrifts, and argue that banks, thrifts, and the GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory
lending problem by operating in the subprime mortgage market in compliance with both state
and federal law.
In part I of this Article, I discuss the continuing problem of predatory lending. Minority,
elderly, and low-income homeowners are still being victimized by unscrupulous lenders,
mortgage brokers, and contractors. They pay too much for credit, obtain loans they cannot
afford, and in some cases lose their homes.30
Part II explores the efforts of state and federal lawmakers and enforcers to address the
predatory lending problem. In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA),31 and many states have since enacted statutes designed to further
protect their citizens from predatory lending abuses.32 Lenders, however, are opposed to state
predatory lending statutes and have pressed federal lawmakers to preempt state law.
In Part III, I examine the possible causes of the predatory lending problem. While the
issues are complex and the precise causes hard to determine, changes over the last 30 years in the
29

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately-owned government-sponsored entities that
support the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans. Seeinfra
Part V.B for a discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
30

See infra Part I.

31

Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16011648 (2000)).
32

See infra Part II.B.
8

operation of the mortgage market for both prime and subprime loans have been a major
contributing factor. While these changes have served the prime market well, they have increased
the likelihood that subprime borrowers will be victimized. Investors in home mortgages can
purchase predatory loans, turning a blind eye to dishonest originators, and can hide under the
holder in due course doctrine and the securitization process to avoid loss and liability. A major
increase in the availability of subprime credit has opened the door to predatory lenders, and
market failures have kept honest subprime lenders from driving the dishonest ones out of the
market. Finally, federal preemption of state consumer protection measures has prevented states
from responding to the full extent possible.
Part IV discusses recent developments in the federal preemption of state predatory
lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory attempts at preemption. In January 2004 the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced that federal banking law preempts
state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.33
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) had previously issued a similar determination earlier
with respect to federal savings associations.34 In addition, a bill currently before Congress would
preempt state predatory lending statutes altogether.35
In Part V, I discuss the involvement of federally-supported lenders–banks, thrifts, and
government sponsored enterprises--in the subprime and predatory lending markets. Banks and
thrifts and the GSEs have taken vastly different approaches to the subprime mortgage market and

33

See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.

35

See infra Part IV.B.
9

the predatory lending problem. Federal banks and thrifts are involved in the subprime mortgage
market and in some cases make or profit indirectly from predatory loans. Banks and thrifts have
sought and obtained protection from state predatory lending initiatives through federal
preemption. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on the other hand, have become increasingly
involved in the purchase and securitization of subprime loans while adhering to guidelines
designed to prevent their purchase of predatory loans. Both have successfully operated under the
patchwork of state mortgage law for many years and the more recent patchwork of predatory
lending laws emerging in an increasing majority of the states.
In Part VI, I argue that the federal government should not preempt state predatory lending
law. Both real estate finance and consumer protection have traditionally been areas governed by
state rather than federal law. In recent years when the federal government has intervened in
these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for
consumer protection rather than preempting the field of regulation. When state governments
regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and can be innovative in
trying new solutions. State enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in predatory
lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
I assert that varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim. Since
subprime loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, the
originators can comply with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase
only from those that do comply with local law. The states already have varying laws governing
real estate finance, so adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and
standards that already differ from state to state. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can
10

further their regulatory goals of leading the market in loans to low and moderate-income families
and in low and moderate-income neighborhoods by participating in the subprime market to a
greater extent and by setting standards for compliance with each state’s law.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been unsuccessful.
As a result, state legislatures have reacted to the problem by enacting statutes aimed at protecting
consumers in their states. This article argues that the federal government should not tie the
hands of state legislatures and state attorneys general who are trying to combat mortgage lending
abuses because predatory lending is still a problem.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING
Predatory lending is alive and well,36 as the lawyers in the trenches is legal aid offices

across the country can attest. Despite federal and state statutory measures aimed directly at
curbing the problem, homeowners are still victimized. In fact, the incidence of predatory lending
has increased since 1994 when Congress enacted HOEPA.37

36

See GAO Report, supra note 23, at 23-25; HUD/ TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note
26, at 22. In March of 2000, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Andrew Cuomo,
formed the National Task Force on Predatory Lending. Id. at 13-14. Task force members
included “representatives of consumer advocacy groups; industry trade associations representing
mortgage lenders, brokers, and appraisers; local officials; and academics.” Id. at 14.
Recommendations in the HUD/Treasury Joint Report are based in significant part on information
gathered by the task force. Id. at 13.
37

See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the
Subcomms. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community
Opportunity of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 1 (2005), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=389&comm=3
[hereinafter Hearing on Legislative Solutions] (statement of Martin Eakes, CEO, Self-Help and
the Center for Responsible Lending) (“As the subprime mortgage market has boomed, climbing
from $35 billion to $530 billion in the decade through last year, so to have abusive loans, which
11

Predatory lending must be distinguished from subprime lending. Subprime loans are
loans with a higher risk of default because of the credit characteristics of the borrowers.38
Borrowers may be a higher credit risk because of previous delinquencies, foreclosures, or
bankruptcies, their debt-to-income ratios, or other factors.39 Because of the greater risk of
default by these borrowers, subprime loans carry higher interest rates than prime loans.40 Even
within the subprime market, interest rates vary according to risk.41 Subprime loans are classified
according to risk as A- (lowest risk), B, C, or D (highest risk),42 with interest rates varying from
about half a point to as much as four points above prime rates.43

are concentrated in this market.”); Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 398 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings
on Predatory Mortgage Lending] (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN
Housing Corp.); 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“With this increase in subprime lending
there has also been an increase in reports of “predatory lending.”).
38

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, & Office of Thrift Supervision,
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs 2 (2001) [hereinafter Expanded Guidance];
Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 311 (statement of John A. Courson,
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n), 345-46 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition).
39

Expanded Guidance, supra note 38, at 2-3.

40

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 27.

41

See id. at 28.

42

Id. at 33.

These grades are not well defined across the industry, but an “A-minus” borrower
may have good credit generally but has had some minor payment delinquencies in
the past year. A “C” or “D” borrower may have a marginal or poor credit history
, including multiple payment delinquencies in the past year or past bankruptcies.
Id. at 33-34. Prime loans are classified as A loans. Id. at 33.
43

Id. at 28. Underwriting standards are not uniform among subprime lenders. JOHN C.
WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS
WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 13, 34 (Hudson Institute 1997). Weicher’s report states:
12

Most subprime lenders provide a valuable service by giving borrowers access to credit to
buy homes, make home improvements, or borrow against the equity in their homes for other
purposes.44 In the past, almost all subprime loans were either home equity loans or home
improvement loans, but in recent years, subprime lenders have also entered the purchase money
loan market.45 Most subprime loans, however, are still made for the purposes of refinancing,
debt consolidation, or general consumer credit.46 Subprime loans used to be primarily second
lien loans, but today they are predominantly first lien loans.47 While most subprime loans are not
predatory, predatory loans are almost always subprime.48

In sharp contrast to the prime mortgage market, there are no generally
accepted underwriting guidelines for the subprime home equity lenders.
Individual firms set their own guidelines. They typically take the same factors
into consideration but set different criteria to qualify for a given credit grade.
Hence, one firm’s B loans may look like another’s C loans. Underwriting appears
to be an art rather than a science. . . .
Id. at 13.
44

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 2-3.

45

See id. at 30.

46

Id.; WEICHER, supra note 43, at 31.

47

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 30, 47. Most home mortgage
loans are not subject to state usury limitations because federal law preempts state usury
limitations for “federally-related” loans secured by a first lien on residential real property in most
states. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
48

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
at 2; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 311-12 (statement of John A.
Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition), 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing
Corp.).
13

Predatory loans are characterized by high interest rates and points that exceed the amount
necessary to cover the lender’s risk,49 excessive fees and closing costs that are usually financed
as part of the loan,50 frequent refinancing or “loan flipping” with additional points and fees,51
lending based on home equity without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay,52 and outright
fraud.53 Borrowers are often required to refinance low interest rate purchase money loans as part
49

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37,
at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment); Hearings
on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 346 (statement of David Berrenbaum,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition), 296 (statement of Esther Canja, President,
AARP). Homeowners may pay interest rates as high as 29 percent per annum. See, e.g.,
Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 5-6 (statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive
Director, Inglewood Neighborhood Housing). They may pay points totaling as much as 33
percent of the amount financed. See Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (letter from
Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att’y, St. Ambrose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr.
(Feb. 17, 1993)) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending].
50

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
at 2, 21; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n); Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the House Banking and Financial Services
Comm., 106th Cong. 12 (2000) [hereinafter called Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices]
(statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
51

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
at 2, 21; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 323-24 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n), 295 (statement of Judith A. Kennedy, Nat’l Ass’n of Affordable Housing Lenders);
Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 50, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler,
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
52

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
at 2, 22; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board
Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
53

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
at 2, 22; Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 233 (statement of Jeffrey
Zeltzer, National Home Equity Mortgage Association), 296 (statement of Esther Canja,
President, AARP), 312 (statement of John A. Courson, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n); Hearing on
14

of the new higher interest rate home equity loan.54 When a borrower has difficulty making
payments on the predatory loan, the lender may encourage refinancing of the debt with a larger
loan carrying a higher interest rate and requiring higher monthly payments and payment of
additional points and closing costs.55 Borrowers rarely obtain any benefit from a loan flip other
than postponing a foreclosure, and they end up owing more after having paid additional points
and fees to the same or another predatory lender. Predatory loans may also have other unfair
terms such as high prepayment fees, balloon payments, exorbitant late charges, and single
premium credit insurance.56 Fraudulent practices include falsifying loan applications, forging
borrowers signatures, changing loan terms at closing, misrepresenting loan terms, physically
obscuring key terms, and having borrowers sign documents with key terms left blank.57 In some
cases, lenders make the loans without regard to the borrowers’ ability to repay, relying instead on

Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 50, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary
for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
54

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, 318 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49,
at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att’y, St. Ambrose Legal Servs., to Sen. Donald
W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)). For example, John Thomas, a disabled African American man,
was required to refinance his 10.5 percent first mortgage at an interest rate of 11.99 percent in
order to get a second lien loan at an interest rate of 23.9 percent. See Hearing on Legislative
Solutions, supra note 37, 2-3 (statement of Martina Guilfoil, Executive Director, Inglewood
Neighborhood Housing).
55

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 21.

56

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 398 (statement of
Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.), 347 (statement of David Berenbaum,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
57

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 347 (statement of
David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); 1993 Hearings on Problems
in Lending, supra note 49, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General,
Commonwealth of Mass.).
15

the borrower’s equity in the home to secure the loan,58 which is an underwriting practice that is
not appropriate for home mortgage lending.
The targets of predatory lenders are most often minorities, the elderly, and the inner-city
and rural poor.59 Borrowers from predatory lenders usually have substantial equity in their
homes due to rising real estate values or to reduction of purchase money debt, but are short on
cash because of their low or fixed incomes.60 They may need money to make home repairs or
improvements, to pay for necessities such as medical care, or to consolidate household debts.61

58

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services), 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National
Community Reinvestment Coalition). In fact, cases have been documented in which monthly
payments on a home equity loan exceeded the borrower’s monthly income. See, e.g., 1993
Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 260 (statement of Terry Drent, Ann Arbor
Community Dev. Dep’t) (discussing monthly payments of $250 required of a borrower with a
monthly income of $220), 292 (statement of Eva Davis, Resident, San Francisco) (discussing
approximate monthly payments of $2,000 required of a borrower with a monthly income of
under $1,100); Gary Chafetz & Peter S. Canellos, Elderly Poor Losing Homes in Loan Scam:
Unregulated Lenders Offer High Rates, Risks, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1991, at 1, 6 (discussing
monthly payments of $2,062 required of a borrower with a monthly income of about $800).
59

See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 37, at 12 (statement of Gary
Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury), 20 (statement of Donna
Tanoue, Chairwoman, FDIC); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 254
(statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.), 257 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.).
60

See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1993, S. Rep.
No. 169, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1993).
61

See id.; 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 449 (letter from
William E. Morris, Director of Litig., S. Ariz. Legal Aid, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 18,
1993)).
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The elderly are particularly vulnerable because they typically have a great deal of equity in
homes that they have owned for many years and because they are likely to be on fixed incomes.62
Perpetrators of predatory lending abuses include lenders, mortgage brokers, and home
improvement contractors.63 These parties seek out particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom
to prey.64 Upon finding a likely prospect, a lender, broker, or contractor may use high pressure
tactics or fraud to induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan transaction.65
Predatory lending can be tremendously profitable for perpetrators of abuses. Mortgage
brokers and lenders who originate loans collect large up-front fees when the loan is made. When
the homeowner makes payments, the lender reaps an enormous profit based on the high interest
rates. If the homeowner cannot pay, the lender forecloses and takes any equity in the house.66

62

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 296-97 (statement of
Esther Canja, President, AARP); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 72; ROBERT
J. HOBBS ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROBLEMS WITH HOME
EQUITY SCAMS, SECOND MORGAGES, AND HOME EQUITY LINES OF CREDIT 9 (Am. Ass’n of
Retired Persons 1989).
63

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 444 (statement of
Consumer Bankers Ass’n); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supranote 50, at 12
(statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Dept. of Treasury).
64

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 17-18 (statement of
Leroy Williams, private citizen). They may check foreclosure notices to find financially
troubled homeowners or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes in need of repair.
See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help Second-Mortgage
Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1476, 1479 (1993).
65

See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 309 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.).
66

See Hearings on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 37, at 318 (statement of Irv
Ackelsberg, Community Legal Services).
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Even if the borrower prepays the loan by refinancing, the lender profits if the loan has a
prepayment penalty.67
The effects of predatory lending are devastating for the individuals who are victims and
for their neighborhoods. At best, the victims of predatory lenders end up paying too much in
fees and interest for their loans. The worst case scenario is that they lose their homes to
foreclosure. A dramatic increase in foreclosures in inner-city neighbors has followed the
increase in subprime lending in recent years.68 For individuals and families, the loss of a home
to foreclosure is devastating, both financially and psychologically.69 Foreclosures caused by
predatory lending have a negative impact on neighborhoods as well since the impact of
foreclosures may be concentrated in low-income areas.70 Vacant homes caused by foreclosures
can cause a decrease property values and an increase in crime that can destabilize at-risk

67

See id. Prepayment penalties are much more common in subprime loans than in prime

loans.
68

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 24. For example, foreclosures of
homes in Baltimore grew from 1,900 in 1995 to more than 5,000 in 1999. Id.
69

Id; Forrester, supra note 27, at 385-86. Financial issues include loss of equity in the
home and in some states the possibility of a deficiency judgment. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms
of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 966-67 (1993). Psychological issues include mental illness,
suicide, crime, family problems, sadness, depression, sleep loss, and anger. See Mortgage
Foreclosures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation
and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
276 (1983) (statement of John J. Sheehan, Director of Legis., United Steelworkers of Am.); Marc
Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE
RECO
RD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359-61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
70

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 25.
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neighborhoods.71 Therefore, predatory lending has an impact beyond the homeowners who
obtain predatory loans.
Problems caused by predatory lenders first caught the attention of lawmakers over a
decade ago.72 However, predatory lending has difficult to regulate in part because it is difficult
to define.73 Some practices, such as fraud, are clearly illegal. Other predatory lending practices
have been perfectly legal, and some individual practices are legitimate under certain
circumstances.74 As the incidence of predatory lending has continued to increase, lawmakers
have continued to grapple with the problem.

II.

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
A.

Federal Response to Predatory Lending
1.

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and Regulation Z

In 1994 in response to problems stemming from predatory lending, Congress enacted the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act.75 HOEPA defines certain home mortgage loans as
“high-cost” loans and, with respect to high-cost loans, requires particular disclosures and
71

Id. See also 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49, at 254 (statement
of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y General, Commonwealth of Mass.) (Predatory lending practices
targeting low-income neighborhoods may result in “the social fabric of many inner-city urban
neighborhoods [being] torn apart and communities destablized.”)
72

See generally 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 49.

73

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.

74

For example, a prepayment penalty could be appropriate in a prime mortgage loan if a
borrower makes an informed decision to include this provision in order to obtain a lower interest
rate.
75

Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16011648 (2000)).
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prohibits designated unfair terms.76 The Act specifically excludes from its application purchase
money mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit,77 so it applies to refinance
loans and to second lien loans that are not lines of credit. HOEPA initially defined high-cost
home mortgage loans as those with an APR more than ten points above Treasury bill rates or
with points and fees exceeding the greater of eight percent of the loan amount or $400, but the
Act provided for adjustment by the Federal Reserve Board after two years.78 HOEPA requires
that lenders make the required disclosures to a homeowner three days before the consummation
of the loan and prohibits the lender from changing the terms of the loan without giving new
disclosures.79 The Act prohibits prepayment penalties under certain circumstances,80 an
increased interest rate on default,81 balloon payments to be made less than five years after the
closing of the loan,82 and negative amortization83 in high-cost loans. In addition, HOEPA
prohibits lenders from engaging “in a pattern or practice” of making high-cost loans without
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.84 HOEPA provides for civil liability for noncompliance85 and for enforcement by state attorney generals.86
76

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.

77

15 U.S.C. § 1603(i), (w), (aa), (bb).

78

15 U.S.C. § 1603(aa). The Federal Reserve Board adjusted the trigger rate in 2002.
See infra notes 95-98.
79

See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), (b).

80

Id. § 1639(c).

81

Id. § 1639(d).

82

Id. § 1639(e).

83

Id. § 1639(f).

84

Id. § 1639(h).

85

See id. § 1640.
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HOEPA eliminates holder-in-due-course status for purchasers of HOEPA covered
loans.87 As a result, assignees of HOEPA loans are subject to all claims and defenses that the
homeowner could have asserted against the originator.88 HOEPA does, however, limit the
liability of assignees to the total amount of the debt paid and remaining unpaid.89 In addition,
HOEPA provides a safe harbor for assignees who can demonstrate that “a reasonable person
exercising ordinary due diligence, could not determine . . . that the mortgage was [a HOEPA
covered loan].”90
Consumer advocates have criticized HOEPA as being ineffective in part because it is not
inclusive enough.91 First, very few subprime loans exceed the interest rate threshold.92 In fact,
lenders may keep interest rates just below the HOEPA trigger in order to avoid the requirements
of the Act. Secondly, the fee trigger excludes reasonable fees paid to third parties93 as well as
fees paid by someone other than the borrower.94 As a result, the trigger does not include
potentially abusive fees such as single premium credit insurance and yield spread premiums paid

86

See id. § 1640(e).

87

See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1); Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Resource Corp., 197 F.Supp.2d
1357 (2002). See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the holder in due course doctrine.
88

15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).

89

Id. at 1641(d)(2).

90

Id. at 1641(d)(1).

91

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85; Hearing on Legislative
Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community
Reinvestment Coalition).
92

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85.

93

15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4).

94

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 85.
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to a mortgage broker. Finally, HOEPA does not apply to high cost purchase money loans,
reverse mortgages or home equity lines of credit.
In response to criticism, the Federal Reserve Board revised regulations under HOEPA
effective October 2002.95 The new Reg Z lowers the trigger for first lien loans to eight points
above Treasury bill rates and includes premiums for credit insurance paid at closing in the fee
trigger.96 In addition, the rule prohibits a creditor from refinancing a high cost mortgage within
twelve months of closing unless the refinancing is in the “borrower’s best interest.”97 This
provision was intended to address the problem of loan flipping.98 Despite the new regulations,
consumer advocates claim that HOEPA is still not effective.99
2.

FTC Enforcement Actions

The Federal Trade Commission has filed enforcement actions against lenders engaged in
predatory lending activities under HOEPA and other federal statutes.100 Between 1998 and

95

66 Fed. Reg. 65604 (2001).

96

12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i).

97

12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(iv).

98

66 Fed. Reg. 65604-1, at 65617.

99

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams,
Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); Protecting Homeowners:
Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomms.
on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of the
House Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 11 (2003), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503ms.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Protecting
Homeowners] (testimony of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law
Center) (“Unfortunately it is clear that HOEPA has not stopped predatory lending. Indeed, the
problem has only grown worse in the eight years since it has become effective.”)
100

Other federal statutes the FTC has used in enforcement actions include the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
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2003, the FTC filed 19 complaints and reached settlements in most of those cases.101 Most of the
settlements required compensation to consumers and an agreement by the lender to stop certain
practices. Some of the most notable settlements include the settlement reached with Citigroup102
and a $60 million settlement with First Alliance Mortgage Company.103 The FTC and other
federal agencies focus their efforts on “cases that will have the most impact, such as those that
may result in large settlements to consumers or that will have some deterrent value by gaining
national exposure.”104 Therefore, the FTC’s enforcement actions have been against some of the
largest and worst offenders.

B.

States’ Response to Predatory Lending

More than thirty states have adopted statutory or regulatory schemes designed to address
the predatory lending problem.105 Many of the state statutes are similar to HOEPA in that

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA), 12
U.S.C. § 2603 (2000), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), § 1692 (2000).
101

See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Subprime Lending cases (since 1998), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/subprimelendingcases.htm; GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at
37, Appendix I. The Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development were involved in some of the cases. Id. These cases involved violations of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §1691 (2000), and the Fair Housing Act
(FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
102

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.

103

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 37.

104

Id. at 40.

105

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791 (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
46:10B-24 to 46:10B-35 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-l (McKinney Supp. 2005); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1349.25 - 1349.37 (LexisNexis 2002); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
456.501 - 456.524 (West Supp. 2005). See also Butera & Andrews, 2005 Detailed Status
23

statutory restrictions are triggered by loans with interest rates or fees in excess of set levels.106
Some have statutes with triggers that are lower than HOEPA’s,107 while others are the same.108
Some of the statutes have multiple triggers with more stringent requirements for loans with
higher levels of interest rates and/or fees.109 Most of the statutes have additional restrictions or
requirements beyond HOEPA’s for loans that are covered.110 Statutes in some states have
increased the regulation and licensing requirements of originators and brokers.111

Summary Chart of State and Local Predatory Lending Legislation, at http://www.buteraandrews.com/state-local/index.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2005).
In addition, some local governments have adopted ordinances prohibiting predatory
lending practices. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUNI. CODE § 5.33 (2001); LOS ANGELES, CAL.,
MUNI. CODE ch. 16 (2003); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 372-02 (Mar. 4, 2002); Dayton, Ohio,
Ordinance 29990-01 (July 11, 2001); NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, LOCAL LAW 36 § 6-128
(2002); Summit County, Ohio, Ordinance 2004-386, 2004-618 (Aug. 16, 2004). However, some
of these ordinances have been held to be preempted by state law. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v.
City of Oakland, 34 Cal.4th 1239, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 (2005) (holding that the Oakland
ordinance is preempted by California’s predatory lending statute); Dayton v. State, 157 Ohio
App.3d 736, 813 N.E.2d 707 (2004) (holding that the Dayton ordinance by Ohio’s predatory
lending statute); Stephen F.J. Ornstein, et al., Local Anti-Predatory Lending Litigation Update,
59 CONS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 153 (2005). Other ordinances are subject to ongoing litigation to
determine whether they are preempted by state law. Id. at 156.
106

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791; GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D);
63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 456.503. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 58.
107

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:10B-24.
108

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 343.201
(Vernon 2001).
109

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24. See also Baher Azmy & David Reiss,
Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of
2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J.645, 674 -76 (2004) (discussing the New Jersey Statute).
110

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:10B-26.
111

See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 62.
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North Carolina was the first state to enact a comprehensive predatory lending statute in
1999.112 Like HOEPA, the North Carolina statute defines “high-cost” loans, but the trigger is set
lower than HOEPA for points and fees.113 For these high-cost loans, the statute prohibits call
provisions giving a lender discretion to accelerate,114 balloon payments,115 negative
amortization,116 increased interest rate upon default,117 financing of any points or fees or charges
payable to a third party (which includes yield spread premiums),118 and making a loan without
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.119 In addition, the statute prohibits the financing of
insurance premiums and “flipping” for all consumer home loans.120 Therefore, the statute goes
beyond HOEPA in offering protection to North Carolina homeowners because it covers more
loans and imposes more stringent restrictions.
Consumer advocates cite the North Carolina statute as a success,121 and a number of
states have followed the lead of North Carolina in adopting statutes with lower triggers and more
112

Act to Prohibit Predatory Lending, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 24-1.1A - 10.2 (2003)).
113

The trigger for points and fees is 5% of the loan amount, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 241.1E(a)(6)(b), rather than 8% of the loan amount set by HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(B)(i).
The trigger for APR is the same as HOEPA’s at 8% above Treasury bill rates. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-1.1E(a)(2).
114

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(1).

115

Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(2).

116

Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(3).

117

Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(4).

118

Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(3).

119

Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(2).

120

Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(4).

121

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes,
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
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prohibitions than HOEPA.122 Despite the additional protection that North Carolina law gives to
subprime borrowers, the subprime market has grown in North Carolina at a rate similar to states
without a similar statute.123 Every significant subprime lender that made loans in 1999 before
the statute became effective continued to do business in North Carolina in 2000 after the statute
was effective.124 North Carolina had 15% more than the national average of subprime loans per
capita in 2000.125
Georgia’s statute, the Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA),126 on the other hand, initially
caused concern until it was quickly amended by the Georgia legislature.127 The statute, in its
original form, was the strongest in the nation. It created three categories of loans: “home loans,”
“covered home loans,” and “high-cost home loans.”128 While the “home loan” category included
most home mortgage loans,129 the other two categories were defined based on a loan’s annual
percentage rate or on points and fees charged.130 The statute created a different set of restrictions
for each of the three categories. Some restrictions, including limits on late fees and a prohibition
122

See, e.g., IND. CODE §§ 24-9-4-1 to 24-9-4-12 (West Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
46:10B-24, 26 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING § 6-l (McKinney Supp. 2005).
123

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes,
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
124

See Center for Responsible Lending, Support H.R. 1182, CRL Policy Brief No. 10
(Mar. 10, 2005) available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pkfs/pb010-MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf.
125

Id. at 2.

126

GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A (2004).

127

S.B. 53, 147th Gen. Assme., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003).

128

GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(6), (8), (9), (19) (Supp. 2002) (amended 2003).

129

Id. §7-6A-2(9).

130

Id. §7-6A-2(6), (8), (19).
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on financing of credit life insurance, applied to all home loans.131 A restriction on flipping
applied to covered home loans.132 Most of the restrictions, including limits on prepayment fees,
a prohibition on negative amortization, and credit counseling requirements, applied only to highcost home loans.133 Finally, purchasers of high-cost home loans were made “subject to all
affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the borrower could assert
against the original creditor . . . .”134
After the Georgia legislature enacted the GFLA, rating agencies responded by refusing to
rate mortgage backed securities secured by pools of residential loans containing any loans
originated in Georgia after the effective date of the statute.135 One of the primary concerns of the
rating agencies and lenders was that assignees would have unlimited liability for affirmative
claims that the borrower could assert against the originator. In response, the Georgia legislature
amended the assignee liability provision of the GFLA to add a safe harbor for lenders who
exercise reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans and to limit the

131

See id. § 7-6A-3.

132

See id. § 7-6A-4.

133

See id. § 7-6A-5.

134

Id. § 7-6A-6.

135

See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in
RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 5, 2003), available
at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html; Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service,
Inc. Moody’s Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential Mortgages in
Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html;
Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act
Loans (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.
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liability of those lenders who do not fit within the safe harbor.136 The rating agencies
subsequently announced that they would again rate pools with Georgia loans.137
Likewise, other states have enacted statutes with assignee liability provisions similar to
the one in the amended Georgia statute.138 These states also include a safe harbor for lenders
who exercise reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans.139
Not surprisingly, lender and mortgage broker advocates have been critical of state
predatory lending laws.140 They claim that state regulations are too burdensome on honest
subprime lenders,141 that compliance with the patchwork of state laws is too costly,142 and that
state laws will have a negative affect on the availability of subprime credit.143 Lender groups
have fought state laws at the state level and have at the federal level proposed that federal law

136

See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2003). The legislature also amended the GFLA to
eliminate the “covered home loan” category altogether. See id. § 7-6A-2.
137

See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 109, at 68.

138

See, e.g.., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a) (Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B24 (West Supp. 2005).
139

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.

140

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President,
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage
Brokers).
141

See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
142

See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
143

See id. at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of
Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
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should preempt state laws. Consumer groups on the other hand applaud the efforts of state
legislatures to combat predatory lending abuses.

III.

CAUSES OF PREDATORY LENDING
To solve the problem of predatory lending, it is necessary to ascertain is causes, and a

number of commentators have suggested possible causes.144 Certainly there are multiple factors
that contribute to the problem. Some of the factors that have led to the proliferation of mortgage
lending abuses are a result of changes in the mortgage market that have occurred over the past
twenty to thirty years.

A.

Changes in the Mortgage Market

Before the mid-1970's most prime mortgage loans were made by depository institutions
using deposits to fund the loans.145 Home mortgage loans were made primarily by thrifts to local
borrowers using savings deposits of local depositors.146 The thrift would handle all aspects of
144

See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV 503, 507 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel
& Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2002); Forrester, supra note 27, at 419; Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury
Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S. CAR. L. REV. 473.
145

In the late 1970s savings and loans made half to as much as 60% of home mortgage
loans. See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 498 n.155 (citing 125 CONG. REC. 29,930 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Morgan) (stating that savings and loans made about 60% of all home
mortgage loans up to 1979) and David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and
Housing Markets, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 173, 180 (1979) (finding that in 1978 savings and loans
made half of all home mortgage loans)).
146

See, e.g., IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (1946). When depositors threaten a “run on the
bank,” Jimmy Stewart, as George Bailey, says:
29

the transaction including the origination of the loan,147 the funding of the loan from it own
capital in the form of deposits, and the servicing of the loan throughout its life.148 The loan
would be held by the local savings and loan until it was paid off or until a default resulted in
foreclosure. Thus, the savings and loan had a long-term relationship with the borrower.
The subprime mortgage market was dominated by finance companies that originated
loans using funds obtained through commercial paper, bonds, bank lines of credit, and both longterm and short-term debt.149 The finance companies held the loans they originated in portfolio150
or used the loans to secure their own debt. The finance company that made a loan thus
performed the origination, servicing, and ownership functions associated with the loans they
made.151 In the past, subprime loans made up a very small portion of the home mortgage
market,152 and most subprime loans were second lien loans.153

You’re thinkin’ of this place all wrong as if I had the money back in a safe. The
money’s not here. Why, your money’s in Joe’s house, that’s right next to yours,
and in the Kennedy house and Mrs. Maplin’s house and a hundred others. You’re
lending them the money to build, and then they’re going to pay it back to you as
best they can.
Id.
147

Origination includes taking a loan application, checking the credit and employment of
the borrower, obtaining an appraisal of the property, and seeing that loan documents are prepared
and executed. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 892 (6th ed. 2003).
148

Servicing includes the collection of payments, holding tax and insurance escrow
accounts, paying taxes and insurance premiums from escrow accounts, and handling defaults.
Id. at 479.
149

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.

150

Id.

151

Home improvement contractors were often involved in the origination of home
improvement loans made by finance companies. Sometimes the contractor originated loans and
sold them to a finance company, and sometimes the contractor referred loans to the finance
30

Today both the prime and subprime mortgage markets operate differently with the
functions of origination, servicing and ownership generally being performed by different parties.
Capital markets are the source of most mortgage loan funds. Fewer loans are originated by
depository institutions, and more are originated by mortgage and finance companies or through
mortgage brokers.154 Mortgage companies are in the business of originating mortgage loans for
sale to investors or to be securitized. Mortgage companies do not require a large amount of
capital available for investment, since they typically hold mortgages only until a sufficient
number of mortgages can be pooled and sold to an investor or securitized.155 The mortgage
company often borrows money to fund the loans through a warehouse line of credit, which the
company draws down as loans are made and repays when a package of loans is sold.156
Sometimes the mortgage company or other originator retains the servicing function, but more
often than not a company other than the originating lender will be servicing the loan.157

company. Abuses in home improvement loans led to the adoption of the FTC’s Holder in Due
Course Rule in 1976. See Julia P. Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for
Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (1996).
152

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 29. In 1983, subprime loans
made up only 1.4% of the home mortgage market. See Fred Faust, Minorities Likely to Pay
More for Loans, Report Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 1999, at C8. Even in 1994,
subprime originations accounted for less than 5% of all mortgage originations. HUD/TREASURY
JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 29.
153

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 30.
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See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 526; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26,
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See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of warehouse lines of

at 39.

credit.
157

See Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure, Automation and
Profit, 61 MORTGAGE BANKING 28 (Jan. 1, 2001), available at 2001 WLNR 4301659.
31

Often the initial contact with a borrower is not even made by the originator of the loan
but by a mortgage broker. Mortgage brokers may be involved in more than half of all home
mortgage loan originations according to the National Association of Mortgage Brokers.158
Brokers are paid a fee by the borrower or the lender and in some cases perform many of the
origination functions other than underwriting and the initial funding. Brokers also may be paid a
yield spread premium if the broker can induce the borrower to borrow at a rate above the rate
offered by the lender for a particular loan.159
Some investors in loan pools purchase and hold them directly, but more frequently today
the loans are securitized with investors buying securities backed by the pool of loans.
Securitization of home mortgage loans began in the prime mortgage market in the 1970s with
Ginnie Mae guaranteeing securities backed by mortgage loans160 and Freddie Mac issuing
mortgage backed securities.161 The private sector first became significantly involved in
securitization in the late 1970s after rating agencies began rating mortgage backed securities not
expressly or impliedly backed by the federal government.162 By the 1980s a significant portion

158

See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 37, at 683 (statement of the
National Home Equity Mortgage Association); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at
39. See also WEICHER, supra note 43, at 32 (stating that brokers originated 36 percent of
subprime mortgage loans in 1996).
159

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.
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See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:2 (3rd ed. 2002). Ginnie Mae is a government agency in the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
161

See infra note 367 and accompanying text.

162

Eggert, supra note 144, at 537; Comm. On Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527,
537 (1995).
32

of mortgage loans were securitized. Securitization did not take hold in the subprime mortgage
market until the 1990s, but is now a major factor in the subprime mortgage market.163
A private lender that wants to securitize a pool of mortgage loans will typically create a
special purpose corporation, trust or other entity, called a special purpose vehicle or SPV.164 The
SPV is created to be “bankruptcy remote” so that creditors of the lender will not have claims
against the SPV.165 The SPV issues the securities to raise cash to purchase the loan pool from
the lender.166 Investors in the securities need only be concerned with the cash flow coming from
the mortgage loans and not with the originating lender’s financial condition.167 Because a
security represents a small interest in a large pool of mortgage loans, the risk of default on any
one mortgage loan is shared among the holders of the securities. The securities are typically
rated by one of the rating agencies,168 and may have a third party credit enhancement such as a
guaranty, surety bond, or bank letter of credit.169 Another type of credit enhancement involves
the issuance of subordinated securities to investors willing to accept additional repayment
163

In 1994, 32% of subprime loans were securitized. By 1998, the rate was 55% before it
dropped back to 37% in 1999. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 41. See also
Glenn B. Canner, et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 241,
249 (1998) (“Most subprime lenders place heavy reliance on securitization of their loans to fund
their operations.”).
164

See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L., BUS. &
FIN. 133, 134 (1994).
165

See id. at 135-36; SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:1.
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SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:1.

167

Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 136.

168

Id. The most well-known rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s Rating Group
(“S&P”), Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) and Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”). See
SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 1:2 n.13.
169

See id. § 2:3.
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risks.170 With credit enhancements, securities backed by subprime loans can achieve investment
grade status.171 As a result, securitization has funneled additional funds into the subprime
mortgage market.

B.

Parties Involved in Origination

Changes in the operation of the mortgage market have contributed to the proliferation of
abusive mortgage lending practices. One of the changes exacerbating the problem is the type of
parties involved in the mortgage origination process. Today loans are originated by mortgage
companies and mortgage brokers whose sole purpose is the origination function.172 Mortgage
companies may fund a mortgage loan initially with borrowed funds, but will sell the loan as soon
as the company has enough loans for a pool. Therefore, a mortgage company does not have to
be highly capitalized.173 Mortgage brokers require even less capital since they typically do not

170

Id. §2:4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 42. Senior securities have
less risk and a lower interest rate, while subordinate securities have greater risk and a higher
interest rate. See Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 143.
171

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 42.
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See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. Subprime lenders rely more on
brokers and “correspondents”–lenders who make loans using funds borrowed through a
warehouse line of credit–than do prime lenders. See WEICHER, supra note 43, at 32-33. In 1996,
47 percent of suprime loans were originated by correspondents and 36 percent by brokers. Id. at
32. In the prime market in the same year, correspondents accounted for 35 percent of
originations and brokers for 22 percent. Id.
173

See Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s Role in Housing Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 24 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996) (“Although it is a stretch
to suggest that anyone with a modem and a fax machine can be a lender today, relatively little
capital is required to start a mortgage banking operation in the 1990s, and even less to become a
mortgage broker.”), quoted in Eggert, supra note 144, at 556. Yesterday’s lenders had to be
more highly capitalized because they generally retained ownership of the loans they originated
for the life of the loans.
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fund loans, but just make a fee for putting borrower and lender together, for taking the
borrower’s loan application, for checking the borrower’s credit, and for otherwise participating
in the origination process.174 As a result, when a borrower has a claim against a mortgage
company or broker for predatory lending practices, the culpable party may be judgment-proof.
Also contributing to the predatory lending problem is the lack of regulation of parties
involved in the origination process. The HUD-Treasury National Predatory Lending Task Force
identified mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, both intermediaries in the
origination of mortgage loans, as being significantly involved in predatory lending practices.175
Both are significantly less regulated than the depository institutions that originated many
mortgage loans in the past. Home improvement contractors are subject to regulation under the
law of some states, but not under federal law.176 Regulation of mortgage brokers is primarily
state law and is modest compared to regulation of the other types of institutions involved in
home mortgage lending.177 The lack of regulation makes it easier to get into the mortgage
brokering business, easier to perpetrate abusive practices, and easier to close up shop before
victims of abuse can be compensated.
The low capitalization necessary for mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers as well as
their lack of regulation has led to the proliferation of mortgage lending abuses by fly-by-night
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Id; HUD/Treasury Joint Report, supra note 26, at 39.
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HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.
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Id.
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Id. at 40. In response to the predatory lending problem, some states have recently
adopted more stringent regulation and licensing requirements for mortgage bankers and
mortgage brokers, including new bonding and educational requirements. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 23, at 62.
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operators. Mortgage bankers and brokers can originate loans using predatory practices, then shut
down and move to another state. When originators quickly sell loans on the secondary market
after origination, the new lender is left to deal with any defenses to payment or may be immune
under the holder in due course doctrine.178 When intermediaries like home improvement
contractors and mortgage brokers are involved in originating a loan, they may be more
concerned with generating fees than with the loan’s ultimate repayment.179 But when the
homeowner seeks a remedy, the intermediary may be judgment proof, may have moved to
another state, or may be out of business. The homeowner may thus be left without a remedy.

C.

Separation of Investors from the Problems

The new horizontal segmentation of the mortgage lending market is also a factor in the
increase in predatory lending. Because of the separation in the functions of mortgage lending,
the party who deals directly with the borrower in brokering or originating the loan may not have
any dealings with the borrower after origination. Although originating lenders sometimes retain
the servicing function, where a broker is involved, the originating lender may not even have an
office in the same community or the same state as the borrower. The parties who broker,
originate, and service loans rarely own the loans they broker, originate or service.
Thus, investors in mortgage loans can separate themselves from any abusive practices.
They do not suffer harm to their reputations that might come about by being involved in abusive
practices. In addition, as discussed below, purchasers of abusive loans are often protected by the
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See infra subpart D.
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HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 40.
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holder in due course doctrine against many of a borrower’s claims or defenses that might arise
from the abusive practices.180 Purchasers of securities backed by predatory loans are further
separated from involvement in the origination or terms of individual loans and are further
insulated from loss.181 Therefore, investors may provide the funding for predatory loans while
turning a blind eye to the abusive practices involved in their origination.

D.

Holder in Due Course Doctrine

One factor that insulates investors in predatory loans from liability is the holder in due
course doctrine. The holder182 of a negotiable promissory note183 becomes a holder in due course
if the note is not obviously forged, altered, irregular or incomplete and the holder takes it for
value, in good faith, and without notice of certain problems.184 A holder in due course holds a
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See Eggert, supra note 144, at 613; Forrester, supra note 27, at 422. See infra subpart

181

See infra subpart E.

D.
182

A holder is a person who obtains an instrument by negotiation. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a)
(2000). Negotiation requires transfer of possession and indorsement for an instrument payable to
the order of a particular party. Id. § 3-201(b).
183

A negotiable instrument is “an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of
money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes
into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money
. . . .”
U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2000).
184

A holder in due course is “the holder of an instrument if:
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note free from personal defenses of the maker and claims in recoupment of the maker against the
original payee.185 Personal defenses include fraud in the inducement, misrepresentation,
mistake, lack or failure of consideration, and breach of warranty.186
The problems that give rise to personal defenses are exactly the types of problems that
often exist in predatory mortgage loans. Therefore, an assignee who is a holder in due course
can avoid these defenses to payment and require the borrower to pay the note despite valid

(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or
incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
(2) the holder took the instrument:
(A) for value;
(B) in good faith;
(C)without notice that the instrument is overdue or has
been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to
payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series;
(D) without notice that the instrument contains an
unauthorized signature or has been altered;
(E) without notice of any claim to the instrument described
in Section 3-306; and
(F) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in
recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).
U.C.C. § 3-302(a).
Good faith requires both “honesty in fact” and “ the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4). In determining if a holder has
observed reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, the test is not whether the holder
exercised care in the purchase of a note but considers rather the fairness of the holder’s conduct.
U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4.
185

U.C.C. § 3-305.

186

U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2.
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defenses to payment.187 The borrower’s only recourse then is to sue the originator or broker who
committed the fraud or engaged in other conduct giving rise to a defense. These parties may no
longer be in business or may be judgment proof.188 Thus,the borrower may have to continue
paying on the note to avoid foreclosure and yet lack any meaningful recourse against the
culpable parties.
The holder in due course doctrine has a history of creating problems for consumers. Prior
to 1976, sellers of goods and services to consumers could separate the consumer’s obligation to
pay from the seller’s obligation to perform by selling the consumer’s note to a holder in due
course.189 The transferee of the note, as a holder in due course free of personal defenses, could
insist on payment even if the goods or services were not delivered, were not performed, or were
defective. The FTC found that sellers used this ability to transfer a note free from contract
defenses as a means to effectuate unethical sales practices in consumer transactions.190
In response to these abuses in consumer sales, the FTC promulgated a trade regulation
rule, the Holder in Due Course Rule, which eliminates the holder in due course doctrine for
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See, e.g., Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F.Supp.2d 530 (E.D. N.Y. 2003) (holding that current
lenders who acquired mortgage loans at closing or on the secondary market were holders in due
course and thus claims based on predatory lending practices of original lenders were dismissed
against current lenders); Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 2005 WL 613535 (Miss. 2005) (holding
that the assignee of home mortgage loan, as a holder in due course, was immune from claims that
the original lender had engaged in predatory lending practices).
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See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of consumers’ Claims
and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022-23 (1976); Forrester, supra note 151, at 1105.
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Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses: Promulgation of Trade Regulation
Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,509 (1975).
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certain transactions.191 The Rule operates by requiring a notice in consumer credit contracts that
makes the holder of the contract subject to claims and defenses that the debtor could assert
against the seller.192 Affirmative recovery by a consumer against the holder of a consumer credit
contract is limited to the amount that the consumer has already paid,193 so the holder’s loss is
limited to the amount to be paid under the consumer credit contract. The FTC Holder in Due
Course Rule applies only to sales of goods or services for personal, family or household use and
for $25,000 or less.194 Therefore, it applies to some home improvement loans, but not to other
home mortgage loans.
At the time the FTC rule was adopted, lenders predicted dire consequences which did not
materialize.195 The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule caused only a small reduction in the
availability of consumer credit.196 In 1988, the FTC reviewed the Rule to determine the
economic impact on small businesses and, in particular, on the availability of credit, but it
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Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3 (2005).
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See id. § 433.2.
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See id. § 433.2 (a), (b).
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Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over
Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 429-30 (2002); William H.
Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine on
the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer Products, 64 B.U. L. REV. 325, 338-39 & n.51
(1984).
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See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 503 (4th
ed. 1995); Eggert, supra note 195, at 429; Lawrence & Minan, supra note 195, at 338-39 & n.51;
Edward L. Rubin, Learning From Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern
commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 775, 789 (1995).
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received few comments in response to its review.197 Honest merchants and lenders were able to
adapt to the FTC Rule, so only the dishonest ones were greatly affected.198
HOEPA has a provision that operates in a manner similar to the FTC Holder in Due
Course Rule for home mortgage loans covered by HOEPA.199 Like the FTC Rule, HOEPA
limits the liability of the assignee of a loan to the amount to be paid under the loan.200 In
addition, many state predatory lending statutes also provide for assignee liability to varying
degrees.201

E.

Further Insulation by Securitization

Independent of the holder in due course doctrine, investors in mortgaged-backed
securities are protected against loss beyond the loss of their investment. Investors hold securities
representing an interest in a pool of loans and are not holders of any individual loans. Therefore,
the risk of loss to the investor is determined by the performance of the entire pool of loans rather
than by any individual loan. In a securitization, an SPV is typically the holder of the loans.202 In
most securitization transactions, the SPV is created for the particular transaction and its only
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See FTC Ends Review of “Holder” Rule, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/holderrul2.htm. The FTC concluded that the Rule had
“not had a significant economic impact on small businesses” and retained the rule as written. Id.
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See Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Credit-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445, 473 (1968).
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See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 134, 136, and 138-39 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
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assets are the loans making up the pool that is the subject of the securitization.203 If a borrower
has a defense to payment of a particular loan that the borrower may assert against the SPV,204
then the loss is spread among the holders of the securities. Even if an SPV as holder of a
predatory loan has affirmative liability to a borrower, its only assets from which to pay that
liability are the other loans in the pool and, once again, the risk is spread among the holders of
the securities. If the SPV becomes insolvent, then the investors lose their investment, but cannot
have further liability to injured borrowers. The borrowers, not the investors, are the ones who
can end up holding the bag.
The risk to investors in mortgage backed securities is further reduced where there are
credit enhancements such as third-party insurance, guarantees, surety bonds, or letters of credit
whereby “a creditworthy party ensures payment of all or a portion of the securities issued by the
SPV.”205 In this case, the third party bears all or some of the risk of loss. Another type of “credit
enhancement” involves the purchase by a third party of subordinated securities.206 The owner of
the subordinated securities bears more of the risk of loss than the holders of the senior securities
who are thus protected against loss. Therefore, investors in mortgaged backed securities are
protected against loss caused by predatory lending practices of the originator even beyond
protection provided by the holder in due course doctrine and even where the doctrine does not
apply.
203

See Schwarcz, supra note 164, at 138.

204

The borrower may be able to assert a defense because it is a real rather than a personal
defense or because the SPV is subject to defenses under HOEPA or a state predatory lending
statute.
205

SCHWARCZ, supra note 160, § 2:3 at 15-16.
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F.

Increased Availability of Subprime Credit Due to Securitization

Securitization of mortgage loans also contributes to the predatory lending problem
because of the greatly increased amount of capital now available for investment in mortgage
loans. When most home mortgage loans were made by depository institutions, the limited
available credit went to prime borrowers.207 The tremendous increase in the size of the market
for subprime loans is a result of securitization. Since the 1990s when securitization of subprime
loans proliferated, the volume of subprime lending has increased drastically from $35 billion in
1994 to $160 billion in 1999208 and to $529 billion in 2004.209 In addition, as securitization of
subprime loans has become more common, prime lenders, Wall Street investment firms, and the
GSEs have become involved as additional players in the subprime market.210
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Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1272-73; Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss,
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 406-07
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loans for home improvement or debt consolidation. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text.
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David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition) (“increased almost 1000
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Top 25 B&C Lenders in 2004, 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Vol. 1
(March 2005).
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primarily with subprime borrowers with A- credit ratings. Id. at 46.
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With the increase in the size of the subprime market has come an increase in predatory
lending abuses.211 Notably, the increase in subprime lending and the related increase in
predatory lending occurred after the enactment of HOEPA. The availability of legitimate
subprime loans to borrowers who do not qualify for prime loans should theoretically reduce the
amount of predatory lending because borrowers should have more options. However, most
victims of predatory lenders do not shop around for the best deal. In fact, many homeowners
with predatory loans did not seek out credit but were approached by the lender, a home
improvement contractor, or a mortgage broker. These homeowners may not understand the
terms of their loans, may not realize they could get credit on better terms, or may have been
fraudulently induced into the loan with promises of better terms than they ultimately receive.212
As a result, predatory lending continues despite the availability of reputable subprime lending
options. The increased availability of funds created by securitization of subprime loans has
made more funds available to predatory lenders as well.

G.

Market Failure

Professors Engel and McCoy make a compelling argument that market failures have been
a key factor in the proliferation of predatory loans.213 They classify the mortgage market into
211

See 66 F.R. 65604 (“With this increase in subprime lending there has also been an
increase in reports of “predatory lending.”). A consumer advocacy group estimated in 2001 that
predatory lending cost affected borrowers to the extent of $9.1 billion annually. See Eric Stein,
Coalition for Responsible Lending, Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending 3,
available at http://responsiblelending.org.
212

See Forrester, supra note 27, at 389-90.
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Engel & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1277-97. See also Forrester, supra note 27, at
419-21 (discussing market failure in home equity loan market).
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three segments: the prime market, the legitimate subprime market, and the predatory loan
market.214 Borrowers in the predatory loan market are disconnected from the credit market
“because of historical credit rationing, discrimination, and other social and economic forces.”215
Some of the borrowers in the predatory market could qualify for prime loans but for some reason
do not have access to the prime market.216 Others are properly classified as subprime borrowers,
but do not have access to the legitimate subprime market. Finally, some simply cannot afford
credit and should not have access to any type of loan.217
People who are disconnected from the credit market are those who for some reason
cannot or do not shop for the best credit deal.218 They tend to be borrowers who do not shop for
credit at all because they may not realize that credit is available. They are targeted by
contractors, brokers, and predatory lenders who take advantage of information asymmetries to
induce the borrowers to take out a loan on disadvantageous terms because they are not aware that
better terms are available.219 Predatory lenders have very different marketing strategies from
legitimate lenders who advertise then wait for borrowers to approach them. Predatory lenders
shop for and approach the borrowers and thus reach borrowers who would not otherwise apply
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for a loan on their own.220 Therefore, the existence of legitimate subprime lenders does not drive
predatory lenders out of the market. Since the market cannot eliminate predatory lending,
government intervention is necessary.

H.

Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Legislation

Another factor in the growth of predatory lending has been the federal preemption of
state consumer protection measures.221 In 1980 Congress enacted the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),222 which preempts state usury ceilings on
any “federally related mortgage loan” secured by a first lien on residential real estate.223 Because
of DIDMCA’s broad definition of “federally related mortgage loan,” the preemption applies to

220

See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.

221

See Forrester, supra note 27, at 388, 419; Mansfield, supra note 144, at 476.

222

Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. at 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
223

12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000). The reasons for Congress’ preemption of state
usury laws were:
(i) to promote the stability and viability of financial institutions by allowing them
to charge and collect realistic market interest on mortgage loans, and (ii) to
promote the national housing policy and the American dream of homeownership
by legislatively opening a spigot which would insure an increased and evenlyspread flow of available mortgage money.
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 911 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quoting Bank of
New York v. Hoyt, 617 F.Supp. 1304, 1311 (D.R.I. 1985). Preemption of usury laws was
necessary to the viability and stability of the nation’s financial institutions because DIDMCA
also eliminated ceilings on interest rates paid on savings and loan deposits. S. REP. NO. 368, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 255. Preemption of usury laws
promoted homeownership because interest rates had risen above usury ceilings in some states
making mortgage funds unavailable in those states since lenders could not make loans at market
rates. Id. at 254-55.
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virtually any first lien home mortgage made by an institutional lender.224 DIDMCA provides
that states could opt out of the usury preemption during a specified time period, but only sixteen
jurisdictions did so.225 Although DIDMCA is limited in its application to first lien loans, lenders
can require a borrower to refinance existing liens in order to fit within the preemption.226 Most
courts that have addressed the issue have held that the DIDMCA preemption applies to nonpurchase money loans so long as the lender has a first lien.227 The issue now appears to be
settled.228

224

See Forrester, supra note 27, at 399. A federally related mortgage loan is any loan that
is (1) made by a lender whose deposits or accounts are federally insured, (2) made by a federally
regulated lender, (3) made, insured, guaranteed, or otherwise assisted by HUD or any other
federal agency, (4) eligible for purchase by FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC, or from any financial
institution from which it could be purchased by FHLMC, or (5) made by any creditor subject to
the Truth in Lending Act who makes or invests in residential real estate loans totaling more than
$1 million per year. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b)(2). For purposes of the usury law preemption, the
term is expanded to include loans made by any lender approved by HUD for participation in a
federal mortgage insurance program and loans made by an individual providing financing for the
sale of the individual’s residence. See id. § 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C)(vi).
225

See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 315 (1993).
226

See Forrester, supra note 27, at 417-18.

227

See Brown v. Investor Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith v.
Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 912 (3rd Cir. 1990); Gora v. Banc One Fin.
Servs., Inc., No. 95 C 2542, 1995 WL 613131 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1995); L.G.H. Enters., Inc. v.
Kadilac Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. (In re L.G.H. Enters.), 146 B.R. 612, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See
also Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D.R.I. 1985) (finding that DIDMCA
applies to construction loans made to residential developers so long as other statutory
requirements are met); FirstSouth F.A. v. Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson Square, Inc.), 61
B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986) (finding that DIDMCA applies to loans made for the
purpose of developing residential real estate so long as the lender takes a first lien on the
property). But see Fidelity Fin. Servs. Inc. V. Hicks, 214 Ill.App.3d 398, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(holding that DIDMCA applies only to purchase money loans).
228

See Mansfield, supra note 144, at 520.
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Because of DIDMCA, subprime lenders can legally charge whatever rate of interest a
particular borrower will pay by requiring a first lien on the borrower’s home. Because of the
market failures discussed above,229 some borrowers will pay interest at a rate higher than the rate
that would reflect the lender’s risk of making the loan.230 One of the characteristics of a
predatory loan is an interest rate that exceeds the amount necessary to compensate the lender for
the risk of making the loan.231 Some borrowers that could obtain prime loans are steered to the
subprime market. Other borrowers are subprime borrowers but pay more interest in the
predatory loan market than they would pay in the legitimate prime market.232 DIDMCA is one
of the causes of the predatory lending problem because states could regulate the rates that lenders
charge on first lien home mortgage loans absent DIDMCA.
Another federal statute, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (Parity Act)
preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage transactions,233 which include variable
interest rate loans, loans with balloon payments, and shared appreciation mortgages.234 The
Parity Act applies to any “loan or credit sale secured by an interest in residential real

229

See supra subpart G.

230

See Engels & McCoy, supra note 144, at 1279 (discussing subprime borrowers who
would qualify for a prime loan); see also Mansfield, supra note 144, at 542 (“[I]t does not appear
that pricing is closely tied to actual risk or any other objective factors.”). As evidence, Professor
Mansfield cites, inter alia, the profitability of subprime lenders and their lack of uniformity in
underwriting and pricing. Id. at 540-41.
231

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

232

See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.

233

12 U.S.C. § 3803 (2000).

234

Id. § 3802(1).
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property,”235 so it is not limited to purchase money loans or to loans secured by a first lien.236
Various federal agencies had adopted regulations that permitted federally chartered financial
institutions to provide alternative mortgage financing,237 and the Parity Act extended the
preemption of state law in this area to apply to other residential mortgage lenders.238 Under the
Parity Act, these other lenders may make alternative mortgage loans that comply with the federal
regulations rather than with state law.239 As with the federal preemption of state usury law under
DIDMCA, states were permitted to opt out of the preemption,240 and several states did.241
Under the Parity Act, predatory lenders have been able to require certain onerous terms in
home mortgage loans because state regulation of those terms has been preempted by the Act.
For example, states may not prohibit balloon payments in home mortgage loans because of
Parity Act.242 Therefore, a predatory loan may be amortized over 30 years, but with a large
balloon payment due after only three years. When a balloon payment becomes due, the borrower
235

Id. Congress enacted the statute because "alternative mortgage transactions are
essential to the provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property.” Id. §
3801(a)(2).
236

See Forrester, supra note 27, at 419.

237

12 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(3).

238

Id. § 3803(c).

239

Id. § 3801(b), 3803(a). Congress gave authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (for banks), the National Credit Union Administration (for credit unions), and the
Office of Thrift Supervision (for other housing creditors) to “identify, describe, and publish those
portions or provisions of their respective regulations that are inappropriate for (and thus
inapplicable to), or that need to be conformed for the use of, nonfederally chartered housing
creditors. . . .” Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 807(b), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 3801 note.
240

12 U.S.C. § 3804.

241

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 6-g (McKinney 1990).
242

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3802(1)(B), 3803.
49

must find the funds to pay off the loan or refinance, which means additional fees and closing
costs. Until recently, predatory lenders could also charge large prepayment penalties and
onerous late charges without regard to state regulation because of the Parity Act.243 Balloon
payments, large prepayment penalties, and onerous late charges are all common features of a
predatory loan.244
In 2003 the OTS removed both prepayment rules and late fee rules from the list of its
regulations that preempt state law under the Parity Act.245 The OTS had determined that “the
application of its late fee and prepayment penalty regulations to housing creditors might be
contributing to predatory lending practices in the subprime mortgage market.”246 The change
was backed by state attorneys general as a means to combat predatory lending.247 In response to
a challenge by the National Home Equity Mortgage Association, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld the right of the OTS to determine the types of loan terms that are
covered by the Parity Act.248 Therefore, states may now regulate prepayment premiums and late
fees for nonfederally chartered lenders. For federal banks and thrifts, however, state consumer
protection measures aimed at combating the predatory lending problem are preempted.
243

12 C.F.R. §§ 560.33, 560.34 (amended). Prepayment penalties are much more
common in subprime loans than in prime loans.
244

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

DIDMCA and the Parity Act allow high interest rates and unfair loan terms that might
otherwise be prohibited by state law. Bankruptcy law prevents the loan terms from being
changed. See Forrester, supra note 27, at 427-35.
245

67 Fed. Reg. 60,542 (2002).

246

National Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, 373 F.3d 1355, 1357 (2004) (citing 65
Fed. Reg. 17,811, 17,813 (Apr. 5, 2000)).
247

373 F.3d at 1361-62.
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IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
A.

Recent Regulatory Developments

In 1996 pursuant to Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA),249 the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) issued regulations that preempt state laws “affecting the operations of federal
savings associations . . . to enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions.”250 The regulation specifically provides
that it “occupies the entire field for regulation of federal savings associations.”251 More
specifically, the regulation preempts state laws that impose requirements regarding licensing,
credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination, and interest rate ceilings.252
Recently, the OTS has issued letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in
Georgia,253 New York,254 New Jersey,255 and New Mexico.256 In addition, the OTS has

248

Id. at 1356.

249

12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68c (2000).

250

12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005).

251

Id.

252

12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). The regulation provides that it does not preempt state laws that
“only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations” such as contract
and commercial law, real property law, tort law and criminal law. Id. § 560.2(c).
253

Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-1 (Jan. 21,
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
254

Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-2 (Jan. 30,
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
255

Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-5 (July 22,
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
256

Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-6 (Sept. 2,
2003) at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf.
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concluded that operating subsidiaries of federal savings associations enjoy the same preemption
as the associations themselves.257
In January of 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a
regulation preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as applied to national banks and
their operating subsidiaries.258 The regulation preempts “state laws that obstruct, impair, or
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending
powers.”259 Specifically, the regulation preempts state law limitations on licensing and
registration, insurance requirements, loan-to-value ratios, amortization, payments, term, escrow
accounts, disclosures, due on sale clauses, and other matters.260 Therefore, the regulation would
preempt state predatory lending statutes.261
In another rule finalized on the same day, the OCC amended its regulation on visitorial
powers.262 The amended regulation provides that “the OCC has exclusive visitorial authority
with respect to the content and the conduct of activities authorized for national banks under

257

Id. at 2 n.4.

258

Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005)). On the same day the OCC
issued regulations preempting state laws in the areas of deposit-taking, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007, nonmortgage lending, id. § 7.4008, and the business of banking generally id. § 7.4009.
259

12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (a) (2005).

260

Id.
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In August of 2003 the OCC made a preemption determination about the Georgia act
only, Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003), and at that time
issued the proposed regulation preempting all state predatory lending laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119
(Aug. 5, 2003).
262

Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2005)).
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Federal law.”263 The OCC claims pursuant to its regulations that state authorities do not have
any visitorial powers over national banks or over their operating subsidiaries.264 The rule
provides that the OCC has exclusive authority to initiate either administrative or judicial
proceedings to enforce state law against national banks as well as against their operating
subsidiaries.265 This amendment goes hand-in-hand with the preemption regulation by making
clear the OCC’s position that states do not have visitorial powers to enforce state laws.
The OCC preemption regulation is similar in its scope to the OTS regulation preempting
state lending requirements as related to federal savings associations. Although the OCC has not
formally adopted a rule of field preemption as did the OTS, the OCC has described its
regulations as having the same preemptive effect as the OTS regulations.266 Thus, virtually all
provisions of every state predatory lending statute would be preempted according to the
regulation.
In an attempt to militate against the effects of preempting state laws aimed at curbing
mortgage lending abuses, the regulation adds certain limits. The regulation prohibits national
banks from making loans “based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or
liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay
the loan.”267 In addition, the regulation prohibits practices that would be unfair or deceptive
263

12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3).

264

See 69 Fed. Reg. 1900-01, 1913.

265

See 69 Fed. Reg. 1897-1900.

266

See 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,129 n.91 (Aug. 5, 2003); OCC, News Release 2004-3,
OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers at 1, 4 (Jan. 7,
2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov; Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 234-35.
267

12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b).
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under the Federal Trade Commission Act.268 Since, however, banks were already subject to FTC
trade regulations, the OCC regulation adds very little.
The OCC regulation explicitly applies to the operating subsidiaries of national banks as
well as to national banks themselves. A national bank may apply to the OCC to acquire or
establish an operating subsidiary,269 and may conduct in an operating subsidiary the same
activities that are permissible for a national bank.270 The permitted activities of an operating
subsidiary include “[m]aking loans” and “[p]urchasing, selling servicing, or warehousing loans
or other extensions of credit, or interests therein.”271 Therefore, the activities of a subprime
mortgage lender could be conducted in an operating subsidiary of a national bank.
In promulgating the new regulations, the OCC stated that operating subsidiaries of
national banks had not been involved in predatory lending.272 However, banks can now transfer
mortgage operations to operating subsidiaries in order to avoid the operation of state predatory
lending statutes and to engage in predatory lending practices. Further, one concern expressed
about the new regulation is the lack of oversight that the OCC will be able to provide.273 So even
with the OCC’s prohibitions against predatory lending practices, the question arises as to the
OCC’s ability to police operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as the banks themselves.
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Id. § 34.3(c).
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12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(5)(i)(A) (2005).
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Id. § 5.34(e)(1).
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Id. § 5.34(e)(5)(v)(C), (D).
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See 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1914.
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See infra notes 447-52 and accompanying text.
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B.

Recent Developments in Congress

In March of 2005, Representatives Bob Ney and Paul Kanjorski274 introduced a bill in
Congress that would amend HOEPA to preempt state predatory lending laws and would
otherwise weaken some of HOEPA’s provisions.275 In addition to providing for the preemption
of state predatory lending statutes, the bill would remove fees currently included in calculating
the trigger for a high cost loan including fees for single premium credit insurance, would not
prevent lenders from “flipping” subprime loans, and would weaken HOEPA provisions for
assignee liability.276 Lending groups support the bill, particularly the preemption of state
predatory lending laws.277 Consumer advocates do not.278

C.

The Law of Preemption

274

Ney is a Republican representing the 18th Congressional District of Ohio, and
Kanjorski is a Democrat representing the 11th Congressional District of Pennsylvania. See
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Member Information,
http://clerk.house.gov/members/index.html.
275

Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005). Earlier in the same month,
Representatives Brad Miller (D-NC), Mel Watt (D-NC), and Barney Frank (D-MA) introduced a
bill that would strengthen HOEPA along the same lines as North Carolina’s statute. See Prohibit
Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1182, 105th Cong. (2005).
276

H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005). See also Center for Responsible Lending, H.R. 1295 –
Responsible Lending Act; Center for Responsible Lending Section-by-Section Analysis, 22-23
(April 6, 2005), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pa-NK_Sections.pdf.
277

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President,
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage
Brokers).
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See id. at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community
Reinvestment), 4 (statement of Martin Eakes, CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible
Lending).
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Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,279 Congress has the
power to preempt state law280 so long as it is acting within the scope of its Constitutionally
delegated powers.281 Determining whether Congress has preempted state law is a matter of
determining Congressional intent.282 Courts may find express or implied Congressional intent to
preempt state law.283 The Supreme Court, however, has created a presumption that areas of the
law traditionally left to the states are not preempted by federal law “unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”284
Express preemption occurs when Congress includes a preemption clause in a federal
statute stating explicitly its intent to preempt state law.285 An example is DIDMCA which
expressly preempts state usury statutes unless a state has opted out.286 Another example is the

279

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution of
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id.
280

See id.; Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996); California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
281

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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Barnett, 517 U.S. at 30; Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).

283

See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)
(“Congress’ intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.’”) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
284

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (quoted in Medtronic . . .);
see also Nina M. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2004);
Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory
Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824 (1995).
285

Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. at 525.
286

12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000).
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Ney-Kanjorski bill currently before Congress that would expressly preempt state predatory
lending statutes.287
If a statute does not contain explicit preemption language, courts must determine
“whether the federal statute’s ‘structure and purpose,’ or nonspecific statutory language,
nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent.”288 The courts have found two
different types of implied preemption, called conflict preemption and field preemption. 289
Conflict preemption occurs when there is an actual conflict between state and federal
law.290 A conflict exists when compliance with both state and federal law would be a “physical
impossibility”291 or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”292 The Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v.
Nelson found a conflict where federal law gave national banks in small towns the authority to
sell insurance and a Florida statute prohibited national banks from selling insurance.293 The
Court did not find a direct conflict since the federal statute did not require banks to sell
insurance, but did find that the Florida statute was an obstacle to the accomplishment of one of

287

Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 105th Cong. (2005).

288

Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31 (citing Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 and Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982)).
289

See McGreal, supra note 284, at 832; Caleb Nelson, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).

290

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. V. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
291

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), cited in
Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.
292

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quoted in Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.
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Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31, 37.
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the objectives of the federal statute.294 HOEPA preempts state law to the extent that state law is
more tolerant than the federal requirements for loans covered by HOEPA.295 For example, if
state law permits a lender to charge a higher interest rate on default in a home mortgage loan
regardless of the loan’s interest rate, HOEPA’s prohibition against a higher interest rate on
default in a HOEPA high-cost loan296 would preempt state law.
Field preemption occurs when a federal statute completely occupies a particular field
which implies that Congress has withdrawn the power of states to legislate in that field.297
Courts find field preemption when the scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or the field is
one “in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”298
Federal regulations can preempt state law to the same extent as federal statutes.299 The
Supreme Court has held that “‘a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally
delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation’ and hence render unenforceable state or local
294

Id. at 31.

295

See Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762,
766 (2002) (“[HOEPA] does not itself preempt any state law–except that state laws about the
mortgage transactions defined in § 1602(aa) may not be more tolerant than the federal floor
adopted in § 1639.”)
296

15 U.S.C. § 1639(c).
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See Nelson, supra note 289, at 227.
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Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230, quoted inFidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
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City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988); Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 153. See
also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (holding that VA regulations permitting the
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laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.”300 Congress can expressly delegate to
an agency the power to preempt state law. For example, the Parity Act gives authority to the
OCC and the OTS to designate which of its regulations preempt state law.301
The power of an agency to preempt state law does not require express congressional
authorization.302 If Congress has not expressed its intent that the agency preempt state law, the
question becomes whether the agency intended to preempt state law, and if so, whether the
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority.303 If regulatory preemption of state
law “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute, [the court] should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.”304
When a regulation expressly states its intent to preempt state law,305 the question arises as
to the deference to be given the agency’s interpretation. This inquiry is complicated by the

VA to pursue a deficiency judgment after foreclosure and payment on its guaranty preempted
Pennsylvania’s anti-deficiency statute).
300

City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. at 63-64 (quoting Louisiana Public Service
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986)).
301

See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

302

Fidelity Fed., 458 U.S. at 154.

303

Id.
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United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961), quoted inCity of New York v.
FCC, 486 U.S. at 64.
305

Both the OCC and the OTS regulations do just this. See Bank Activities and
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1917 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2005)) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (OTS).
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sometimes conflicting mandates of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.306 and Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.307 In Rice, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption against
preemption of state law.308 In Chevron, which was not a preemption case, the Court held that
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.309 Therefore, when an agency preempts
state law, the question is whether the presumption against preemption trumps deference to the
agency interpretation or vice versa. The law is not clear as to how the mandates of these two
cases should be reconciled.310 Some commentators have suggested that Chevron deference
should yield to the Rice presumption in preemption cases.311 The issue arises in the context of
the OCC and OTS regulations.

D.

Authority of the OTS and OCC to Preempt State Predatory Lending Laws

The question arises as to the authority of the OCC and the OTS to preempt state lending
laws including laws regulating predatory lending practices. While OTS authority to issue broad
regulations preempting state law is settled,312 the law regarding OCC authority under its new
regulations remains untested.
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331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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331 U.S. at 230.
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467 U.S. at 866.
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See Mendelson, supra note 284, at 739; McGreal, supra note 284, at 887.
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Mendelson, supra note 284, at 799-800.
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See infra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
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Both OCC and OTS regulations include express statements of preemption.313 Therefore,
it is clear that both agencies intend to preempt state predatory lending statutes. The question
then becomes whether the agencies are acting within the scope of their delegated authority.
However, the analysis of OTS regulations issued under HOLA and OCC regulations issued
under the National Banking Act (NBA)314 is not the same.315
The Supreme Court has held that section 5(a) of HOLA gave the predecessor agency to
the OTS “plenary authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans.”316 The
National Banking Act, however, does not give the OCC comparable authority.317 One court
stated the difference as follows: “As to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field for
state regulation and the application of state laws; but as to federal savings and loan associations,
Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation . . . leaving no room for state supervision.”318

313

See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (providing that the regulation “occupies the entire
field for regulation of federal savings associations”); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (providing that”states
laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally
authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.”).
314

12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (2000).

315

See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 321-24.

316

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982) (quoted in
Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 322).
317

See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 322. But see Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins,
National Bank Act Preemption: The OCC’s New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to Consumer
Protection or the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365, 391-96 (2004)
(arguing that the OCC does have authority to preempt state law).
318

People v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 98 F.Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Although only a district court case, other courts including the Supreme Court have cited Coast
Federal for its holding as to the expansive authority of the OTS and its predecessor. See
Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 323 (citing Fed. Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145
(1982); Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979),
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Other federal courts have distinguished the “broad preemptive authority of the OTS and the
much more circumscribed power of the OCC.”319
Commentators differ on whether the new OCC regulation is within the scope of
Congressionally delegated power.320 The focus of this article, however, is not on whether the
OCC is authorized to preempt state predatory lending statutes, but rather on the normative issue
as to whether the OCC should preempt state predatory lending laws. Part of the answer lies in
the involvement of banks in predatory lending abuses. The OCC claims that banks have not
been involved in predatory lending except to a very minor extent, but evidence to the contrary
exists.

V.

INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERALLY-SUPPORTED LENDERS IN THE SUBPRIME AND PREDATORY
LENDING MARKETS
A.

Banks and Thrifts

aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 (2003)).
319

Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 323 (citing North Arlington National Bank v. Kearny
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 187 F.2d 564, 567 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951);
Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069
(2003); Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
320

See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 317, at 391-96 (arguing that the OCC does have
authority to preempt state law); Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 287-316 (arguing that the regulations
are not within OCC’s authority); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory
Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (arguing that “the OCC
overstepped its congressionally delegated authority when it promulgated the regulation”).
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Banks and thrifts are in fact involved in predatory lending in a number of ways. Some
banks and thrifts or their subsidiaries and affiliates do originate predatory loans.321 Furthermore,
banks and thrifts can profit from predatory lending by purchasing predatory loans or securities
backed by predatory loans, by lending to predatory lenders and thus financing their predatory
lending practices, by providing securitization services to predatory lenders, and by steering
customers who could qualify for prime loans to subprime loans.322
Some banks and thrifts are subprime lenders,323 and some have practiced predatory
lending abuses.324 Banks and thrifts are increasingly involved in the subprime mortgage market
through subsidiaries and affiliates,325 and some of the subsidiaries and affiliates engage in
321

See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy,
The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1575-76 (2002).
322

See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at
1577-78. See also HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45 (discussing bank and
thrift involvement in the subprime market).
323

At the time of HUD/Treasury Joint Report, one percent of FDIC insured institutions
were subprime lenders, defined as lenders with more than 25 percent of their equity capital in
subprime loans. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 44.
324

See, e.g., McCarthy v. FDIC, 348 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the OTS
closed Superior Bank because of its predatory lending practices); State of Arizona v. Hispanic
Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., CV 2000-003625 (2003); In the Matter of Clear Lake National
Bank, San Antonio, Texas, OCC Enforcement Action 2003-135 (Nov. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2003-135.pdf (finding violations of HOEPA, RESPA,
TILA and the FTC Act). See also OCC, News Release, OCC Issued Final Rules on National
Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers, NR 2004-3 (Jan. 7, 2004) (quoting John Hawke as
saying, “We have seen only isolated cases of abusive practices among national banks.”); NCLC
Comments, supra note 24, at 3-6 (listing cases against national banks for alleged predatory
practices).
325

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45. Banks, savings associations,
and their affiliates originated approximately one quarter of all subprime loans in 1998, id., and
eight of the ten largest subprime lenders in 2000 were affiliated with banks, Engel & McCoy,
supra note 321, at 1585 (citing Robert Julavits, Subprime Risks Extending Beyond Borrowers,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 9).
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predatory lending practices.326 Bank affiliates, including Citigroup and Household, have paid
huge sums in settlement of allegations of predatory lending practices.327 Borrowers have sued
national banks, their operating subsidiaries, or their affiliates for practices including fraud and
misrepresentation, loan flipping, and violations of HOEPA, the Truth in Lending Act, the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and state consumer protection laws.328
When banks make subprime loans or have affiliates that make subprime loans, they can
steer customers who would qualify for a prime loan to a subprime loan or to their subprime
affiliate.329 Citifinancial is currently under investigation by the New York attorney general for
steering customers to subprime loans.330 Banks profit when borrowers pay more for credit than
they should have to pay based on their credit histories.
Banks and thrifts also purchase predatory loans to hold or securitize or purchase
securities backed by predatory loans.331 When banks purchase predatory loans, they can
generally take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine unless the loans are high cost
mortgages as defined by HOEPA. When banks securitize loans, they generally employ various
contractual forms of recourse that require the originator or seller to repurchase the loans in the
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See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

327

See supra notes 12, 17, and 23 and accompanying text.

328

See NCLC Comments, supra note24, at 4-6.

329

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1578-80.

330

See Citigroup Violated Policy, supra note 20, at C1.

331

See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 3; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1576.
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event they do not conform to certain standards.332 Thus, banks and thrifts can profit from
purchasing predatory loans or securities backed by predatory loans without concern for liability.
Banks have recently played an important role in securitizing subprime loans “because of
their access to credit markets and their expertise in securitizing mortgages.”333 Banks may
“serve as underwriters, trustees, registrars and paying agents for securitizations of subprime
loans, some of which may be predatory.”334 National banks have served as trustees for notorious
predatory lenders including Associates, Household Finance, Delta Funding, and First Alliance.335
Finally, banks may finance predatory lenders through warehouse lines of credit secured
by the predatory loans.336 With a warehouse line of credit, a mortgage company uses borrowed
funds to originate mortgage loans that will eventually be packaged and sold on the secondary
market or securitized.337 Therefore, banks can facilitate the practices of predatory lenders by
lending them the funds they use to make predatory loans. When banks hold predatory loans as
security for a line of credit, they again can take advantage of the holder in due course doctrine
unless the loans are high cost mortgages as defined by HOEPA.

332

See Eggert, supra note 144, at 548.

333

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45.

334

Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1577.

335

See NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 6-7.

336

See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45; Engel & McCoy, supra note
321, at 1577.
337

See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 487. After each mortgage loan is made,
the note and deed of trust are temporarily pledged to the bank as collateral for the line of credit.
It is called a warehouse line of credit because “the mortgage loans are ‘parked’ in the bank’s
‘warehouse’ for a short period (perhaps 30 to 90 days) until the mortgage company is ready to
sell them to secondary market investors or securitize them.” Id.
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Banks and thrifts receive a number of federal benefits not available to others involved in
the business of home mortgage lending. Banks and thrifts receive a gross federal subsidy from
the federal safety net, which includes federal deposit insurance as well as access to the Federal
Reserve’s discount window and payment system.338 First, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits of member institutions up to $100,000,339 and deposit
insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government.340 As a result, banks
and thrifts can attract deposits for lower interest rates than uninsured institutions because the
deposits are insured by the federal government. Even uninsured deposits have protection
through the federal government’s bank resolution practices.341 In addition, banks and thrifts
have access to the federal reserve system. The Federal Reserve’s discount window provides a
backup source of credit to banks,342 and the Federal Reserve’s payment system includes
338

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586; Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in
Banking: The Link to Financial Modernization, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. Econ. Ltr. No. 97-31
(Oct. 24, 1997), available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-31.html; Kenneth
Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for
Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 1 (1999); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E.
Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895,
1895, 1917 (1997); Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for
Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING L.J.446, 466 (1998); John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net
Subsidy Be Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECONOMIC Q., Winter 1998, at 1, 2.
339

See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 8.03 [1][b][ii] (2nd ed. 2001 & cum.
supps.). Bank deposits are insured by the Bank Insurance Fund and thrift deposits by the
Savings Association Insurance Fund, both of which are administered by the FDIC and are funded
with premiums paid by banks and thrifts, respectively. Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3
n.3.
340

Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3. Resort to the full faith and credit of the U.S.
Treasury was necessary to resolve the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See id.
341

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586.

342

See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 3.
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overdraft protection for interbank transfers on Fedwire.343 In addition to the federal safety net,
banks’ and thrifts’ charters give them a quasi-oligopoly because entry by new competitors is
controlled by government regulators.344
In exchange for the benefits they receive, banks and thrifts are highly regulated. National
banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.345 A primary aim of bank
regulation is “to ensure the safe and sound practices and operations of individual banking
institutions” and therefore to protect taxpayers and depositors.346 “Banks have high regulatory
compliance costs, including examination and reporting requirements, reserve requirements, and
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums (although risk-adjusted premiums have been
essentially toothless in recent years because most banks pay zero premiums).”347 Thrift
institutions also are heavily regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).348
Whether federal banks and thrifts receive a net federal subsidy, in other words, whether
federal benefits that banks and thrifts receive outweigh regulatory costs, is the subject of

343

See id.

344

See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 3.01; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586.

345

See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 2.02[2][a]. State chartered banks are regulated by their
state’s banking agency as well as by the Federal Reserve, in the case of state member banks, or
the FDIC, in the case of state nonmember banks. Id.
346

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 900 (quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS
FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE (1996)).
347

Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587.

348

See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 2.02[2][b].
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debate.349 Some commentators have concluded that a net subsidy exists in bad economic times
and that the subsidy is zero or slightly negative in good economic times.350 The fact that banks
choose to retain their charters provides some evidence that they at least believe that the federal
subsidy outweighs the regulatory cost, and the same goes with respect to thrifts.351
Recent federal preemption of state law changes the balance in determining the existence
of a net federal subsidy because federal preemption reduces regulatory costs for national banks
and for thrifts. In fact, some predatory lenders have sought federal charters because of the
benefits of federal preemption of state law.352 “Associates and Commercial Credit applied for
thrift charters in late 1997 and early 1998. Both companies stated that federal preemption of
individual state regulations accorded federal savings associations was one reason for their
application.”353 The OTS preemption of state lending laws for thrifts used to be an advantage of
choosing a thrift charter over a bank charter.354 The OCC has now evened the playing field by
similarly preempting state laws for the benefit of banks which will reduce the regulatory
compliance costs of banks. The visitorial powers preemption also reduces regulatory compliance

349

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1586-88; Furlong, supra note 338; Jones &
Kolatch, supra note 338, at 9-10; Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 338, at 1918-19; Walter,
supra note 338, at 9.
350

See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587; Shull
& White, supra note 338, at 466-67. In addition, banks engaging in riskier activities receive a
larger subsidy than do safer banks. Jones & Kolatch, supra note 338, at 9.
351

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587; Furlong, supra note 338.

352

HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 45 n.54.

353

Id.

354

See MCCOY, supra note 339, §3.02.
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costs. Thus, the reduction in regulatory costs increases the likelihood that a net federal subsidy
does exist.
What is the relationship between any net federal subsidy and bank involvement in
predatory lending? Certainly when banks or thrifts make predatory loans, purchase predatory
loans, purchase securities backed by predatory loans, finance predatory lenders with warehouse
lines of credit, they are profiting to the detriment of affected homeowners. In addition, bank
affiliates involved in predatory lending activities may enjoy a spillover of any net federal
subsidy.355 A spillover can occur when a bank lends money to its affiliate or shifts riskier
activities from an affiliate to the bank.356
Regardless of whether predatory lenders receive a benefit from any federal subsidy,
banks and thrifts should avoid direct or indirect involvement in predatory lending activities.
Banks enjoy a special status of trust in the minds of the public, which is perpetuated by the gross
federal subsidy. Banks should not betray that trust by engaging in predatory lending activities or
advancing the interests of predatory lenders. Thrifts and national banks should not be exempt
from state consumer protection laws aimed at stemming the tide of predatory lending activities.
Banks are not the only entities involved in residential mortgage lending that receive
special federal benefits. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also receive federal benefits and are
subject to more federal regulation than purely private entities involved in mortgage lending. But
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken an entirely different approach to the problem of
predatory lending.
355

See id. § 4.02; Walter, supra note 338, at 9-10.
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B.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government sponsored enterprises--privately owned
corporations operating under federal charters that impose restrictions on their activities and grant
benefits that other private corporations do not enjoy. The President appoints five of the eighteen
directors of both Fannie Mae357 and Freddie Mac,358 while the rest are elected by shareholders.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The
benefits they receive as GSEs include exemption from state taxes except for real property
taxes359 and exemption from federal securities laws.360 Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
not government agencies, their guarantees are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
federal government; however, there is an assumption that the federal government would honor
their obligations in the event of financial trouble.361

356

See MCCOY, supra note 339, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 321, at 1587-88;
Walter, supra note 338, at 9-10.
357

12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (2000).

358

Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A).

359

Id. § 1433.

360

Id. § 1455(g) , 1723(c).

361

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: POTENTIAL IMPACTS
OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP 17 (1996). See also Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief
Urges Cutback in Scale of 2 Big Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at C1 (“Mr. Greenspan,
who has long criticized both companies, said they had been able to borrow almost unlimited
amounts of money at below-market rates by virtue of the widespread by false impression among
investors that the federal government would ride to their rescue if necessary.”)
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Fannie Mae was the first GSE and had its origins during the Great Depression under the
New Deal leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In response to problems of widespread
foreclosures during the Depression and wide variation across the country in interest rates and
availability of mortgages, President Roosevelt’s National Emergency Council recommended the
establishment of a program for long-term, federally-insured mortgages and the creation of
national mortgage associations to purchase these mortgages.362 Congress responded by creating
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure home mortgage loans and by authorizing
the charter of mortgage associations to purchase the insured mortgages.363 In 1938 Congress
chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, now called Fannie Mae).364
FNMA was initially a government agency that issued bonds to raise funds for the purchase of
FHA-insured mortgages and, beginning in 1944, Veteran’s Administration (VA)-guaranteed
mortgages as well.365 In 1968 Congress divided the functions of Fannie Mae between two
entities--Fannie Mae, which became a GSE and was allocated the secondary market operations
of the former entity, and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which

362

Regulations Implementing Authority of HUD Over Conduct of Secondary Market
Operations of FNMA, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,200, 36,200 (Sept. 14, 1978). Until the 1930s, the typical
home mortgage loans was for only a three- to five-year term. Id. Homeowners were required to
refinance their homes frequently, and during the Great Depression when refinancing was not
available, many lost their homes to foreclosure.
363

See id. at 36,200-01 (citing National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 479, 48 Stat.
1252 (1934)).
364

See id. at 36,201. The association was originally named the National Mortgage
Association of Washington, but was renamed the Federal National Mortgage Association later
the same year. Id.
365

See id.
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remained a division of HUD and was given the special assistance and the management and
liquidation functions of the former Fannie Mae.366
In 1970 the Emergency Home Finance Act created a new GSE, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and also authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional
mortgages.367 Freddie Mac started the trend towards mortgage securitization in the 1970s, while
Fannie Mae continued to purchase mortgage loans to be held in its portfolio. Fannie Mae
became involved in securitization in the 1980s. Today Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are almost
identical in their charters and functions. They both purchase home loans to hold in their
portfolios but securitize even more loans.
When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize loans, the GSEs themselves issue the
securities.368 The securities are backed by a pool of mortgage loans, and holders of the securities
generally receive their pro rata share of principal and interest payments.369 In some cases the
securities are guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. In most cases no credit enhancement in necessary
because of the implied federal guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s obligations.
Through their purchases and securitization of residential mortgage loans, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac together provide the largest source of home mortgage financing in the nation. For
example, in 2001 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together purchased or securitized forty percent of
366

See id. (citing Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §
802(c), 82 Stat. 476, 536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716(h) (2000)).
367

Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-51 (1971) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1717 (2000)).
368

Private securities offerings are usually made by a special purpose entity created for the
purpose of issuing the securities. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text,
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all conventional mortgages originated that year.370 Fannie Mae purchased $568 billion of
residential mortgage loans and issued $515 billion of mortgage-backed securities in 2001, while
Freddie Mac purchased $393 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $387 billion of
mortgage-backed securities in the same year.371 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac thus facilitate the
flow of money into the residential mortgage market in accordance with the purposes set out in
their charters.
In the late 1980s, housing advocates believed that the underwriting guidelines used by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac favored white suburban homebuyers.372 In response Congress
enacted the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
(FHEFSSA) to give Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incentives to increase their purchase of loans
to low and moderate-income families and in low and moderate-income neighborhoods.373 The
Act required HUD to set affordable housing goals for loans purchased by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac,374 and mandated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “lead the industry in affordable
lending.”375 It also prohibited them from discriminating on the basis of prohibited factors.376
369

These securities are called “pass-through” securities. The GSEs also issue other types
of securities.
370

OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKETS AND THE
ENTERPRISES IN 2001 13 (2002).
371

Id. at 13, 17.

372

BRENT W. AMBROSE & THOMAS G. THIBODEAU, HUD, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS
OF THE GSE AFFORDABLE GOALS ON LOW-AND MODERATE-INCOME FAMILIES 2 (2002).
373

Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13,

374

Id. §1331(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4561(a) (2000)). HUD set goals for loans
secured by homes of low- and moderate-income homeowners/renters at 50 percent and loans
located in underserved areas at 31 percent. See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 372, at vii.
375

See SENATE REPORT 102-282 § 35.
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Finally, the Act established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight as an office of
HUD to monitor both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.377
A recent study sponsored by HUD considered the impact of the affordable housing goals
required by the FHEFSSA on low and moderate-income families.378 The study found that the
goals helped make homeownership more attainable for these families.379 In response to
FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted more flexible underwriting standards and
introduced automated underwriting systems which reduced underwriting costs. As a result,
lenders that sell loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using more flexible underwriting
standards that permitted more borrowers to qualify for the loans.380 In addition, purchases by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of loans to lower income borrowers and in target neighborhoods
increased liquidity and allowed additional lending activity to these borrowers and in these
neighborhoods.381 The study suggests that the affordable housing goals have thus helped make
homeownership more attainable to low and moderate-income families.
In the late 1990s, both GSEs were accused of being involved in the predatory lending
problem by purchasing and securitizing subprime loans that could be characterized as predatory.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac responded immediately with initiatives to avoid purchasing
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See Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. 13, § 1325(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §4545 (2000)).

377

Id. § 1311 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §4511 (2000)).
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AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 372, at vii.
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Id. at ix.
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Id. at vii-ix.

381

Id. at ix.
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or securitizing predatory loans.382 Fannie Mae will not purchase or securitize loans with points
and fees in excess of five percent, loans identified as “high-cost” mortgages under HOEPA,
loans with prepaid single premium credit insurance, or loans with prepayment premiums unless
the borrower has received a benefit.383 Fannie Mae requires its lenders to determine the
borrower’s ability to repay, to avoid steering borrowers to higher-cost loans if they qualify for a
lower-cost loan, to report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit repositories (to improve
the borrower’s credit history), and to maintain escrow deposit accounts.384 Freddie Mac will not
purchase HOEPA loans, loans with single premium credit insurance, loans with prepayment
penalties that continue for more than three years, or loans with mandatory arbitration clauses.385
Freddie Mac requires its lenders to report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit
repositories and refuses to purchase loans from lenders that engage in predatory lending
practices.386

382

See Fannie Mae, News Release, Fannie Mae Chairman Announces New Loan
Guidelines to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000) at
http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2000/0710.jhtml [hereinafter Fannie Mae News
Release] (citing Lender Letter LL03-00, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished
Credit Histories, 4/11/00); Freddie Mac, News Release, Freddie Mac Announces Steps to Protect
Borrowers from Predatory Lending Practices (Mar. 24, 2000), at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives2000/predatory.htm.
383

See Fannie Mae News Release, supra note 382.

384

See id.

385

See Freddie Mac, Combating Predatory Lending, Freddie Mac’s Efforts to Protect
America’s Consumers, at http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/anti-predatory.html
386

See id.
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More recently, the GSEs have been criticized on the basis that they are failing to “lead
the industry in affordable housing.”387 While the GSEs have become involved in the subprime
market, their involvement has been primarily limited to purchasing loans to A- borrowers.388
They have not purchased or securitized loans to B, C, and D rated borrowers. HUD has
encouraged both GSEs to become involved in subprime mortgage lending to a greater extent.389
Several states exempted the GSEs from the application of their predatory lending statutes
or limited the application of the statutes to the GSEs.390 The GSEs sought exemption from
Georgia’s statute before it was enacted, but received negative publicity for doing so.391 As a
result, they withdrew their proposal and have since avoided seeking additional exemptions or
limitations.392 Thus, the GSEs have continued to purchase and securitize loans in all fifty states
in compliance with state predatory lending statutes in those states that have such statutes and
have not exempted the GSEs.
387

David S. Hilzenrath, HUD Chief Criticized Fannie Mae, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at
E02. In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been criticized on numerous fronts.
They have been criticized on the basis that they have an unfair competitive advantage over
wholly private mortgage investors, based on concerns about their financial stability and the
feared effects of their failure on the national economy, and because of misleading financial
disclosures. See Andrews, supra note 361, at C1; Stephen Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1.
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See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 74; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note
26, at 46. The GSEs also purchase loans to “Alt-A” borrowers, “prime borrowers who desire
low down payments or do not want to provide full documentation for loans.” Id. at 46 n.56.
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See Hilzenrath, supra note 387, at E02.
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See, e.g., D.C. and California ; see also Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending
Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78, 84 (2002).
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Patrick Barts, Fannie Mae in Tiff Over Abusive Loans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at

A1.
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The GSEs, therefore, have taken a very different approach to the problem of predatory
lending from that of banks and thifts. The GSEs have become involved in the purchase and
securitization of subprime loans, have adopted policies designed to avoid the purchase of loans
with predatory terms, and have for the most part remained subject to compliance with state laws.
National banks and thrifts on the other hand have claimed their hands to be clean and have now
avoided the requirement of complying with state law. In the defense of banks, they have been
involved in the subprime market beyond the A- credit level. However, by avoiding compliance
with state law, some banks can remain a part of the problem.

VI.

FEDERAL LAW SHOULD NOT PREEMPT STATE PREDATORY LENDING STATUTES
Although the validity of the OCC’s preemption of state lending laws for national banks

is still in question,393 no doubt exists that Congress may if it chooses preempt state predatory
lending statutes altogether or may expressly grant to federal agencies the power to preempt the
statutes as applied to banks and thrifts. The issue then is the normative case for federal
preemption of state predatory lending laws; that is, whether Congress should preempt state
predatory lending laws for all lenders, as would the bill currently before it, and whether federal
agencies should preempt the laws for thrifts, banks, and their operating subsidiaries.

A.

States Traditional Role in Real Estate Finance and in Consumer Protection

392

See Lampe, supra note 390, at 84.

393

See supra Part IV.D.
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Real estate finance law was traditionally an area governed by the states. Although the
federal government became involved in creating housing policies and housing programs during
the New Deal, it was only in the 1960s that the federal government first became involved in
direct regulation of real estate finance.394 Most of the early statutes were disclosure laws that
created a minimum standard.395 Congress made it clear that these statutes were only to preempt
state law to the extent of a conflict.396 Although Congress has acted in several areas to expressly
preempt state law,397 the bulk of law governing real estate finance is still state law.
Consumer protection also has traditionally been primarily a state responsibility. While
the federal government has also been involved in specific areas of consumer protection,
particularly through the FTC, these measures have traditionally been in addition to state
consumer protection laws and have been treated as creating a minimum standard rather than
preempting the field. HOEPA creates a minimum standard, but does not otherwise preempt state
law.398

394

See Alexander, supra note 225, at 311-13.

395

See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968 (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-312, tit. I, 83 Stat. 146
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000)); Real Estate Settlement and Procedures
Act of 1974 (RESPA), Pub. L. No. 95-533, § 4, 88 Stat. 1724, 1725 (1974) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2000)). See also Kathleen Keest, The Consumer Lending Revolution:
Economic Consequences, The Regulatory & Legislative Framework, available at
www.responsiblelending.org (“[TILA and RESPA] were additions to, not substitutes for, the
substantive regulation in state law. Disclosure was not the endgame, and federal law generally
set the floor, not the ceiling.”).
396

See Alexander, supra note 225, at 315.

397

See DIDMCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f -7a (2000); Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (2000);
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2000).
398

See Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762,
766 (2002), quoted supra in note 295.
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Because of the tradition of state governance of real estate finance and consumer
protection laws, advocates of federal preemption of state law bear the burden to support a change
in policy and show that federal regulation would be superior. While there are advantages to
uniformity, they are not outweighed by the benefits of letting each state choose its approach to
the problem of predatory lending.

B.

The Role of State and Federal Government

1.

Our Federal System

Numerous advantages exist to a system of varying state laws, and the Supreme Court
outlined those advantages in Gregory v. Ashcroft:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous
advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.399
The fact that different states have reacted differently to the problem of predatory lending
indicates a need for different solutions. The fifty states vary along racial, religious, and cultural

399

501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)).
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lines,400 and the differences among the states have resulted in varying political climates and
differing approaches to societal issues.401 The differences are apparent in the types of consumer
protection measures that a state may adopt for home mortgage borrowers. Some states take an
activist approach to protecting consumers with statutory rights of redemption,402 one action
rules,403 stringent limitations on deficiency judgments,404 and strong predatory lending laws.405
Other states take a more “hands off” approach favoring business interests.
State legislatures can be responsive to their citizens in a way that the federal government
cannot. Congress may enact laws that are responsive to the needs of most Americans but that
may not be responsive to the needs of the citizens of a particular state. Two empirical studies
suggest that state legislators are responsive to public opinion in their states.406 Not surprisingly,
400

See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law
in the 1900s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261,
1301 (1991).
401

Id.

402

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1282 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 729.010-90,
726(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 580.23, 580.24 (2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 66-8-101, 66-8-102 (2004).
403

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-37-1 (2002).
404

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2005).
405

See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.

406

Schill, supra note 400, at 1311-12. One study used the percentage of votes for George
McGovern in the 1972 presidential election to indicate the liberal or conservative nature of a
state compared with liberal state policies. David C. Nice, Representation in the States:
Policymaking and Ideology, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 404, 405-06 (1983). The other study used a survey
which asked residents of different states whether they considered themselves to be liberal,
conservative or moderate and compared the results with state policies. Gerald C. Wright, Jr.,
Robert S. Erikson & John P. McIver, Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American
States, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 980, 985 (1987).
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the studies conclude that laws of more liberal states reflect liberal policies while the laws of more
conservative states reflect more conservative policies.407 Therefore, legislatures in more liberal
states may enact tougher consumer protection measures, while legislatures in more conservative
states may regulate subprime lenders to a lesser degree.
Another advantage of state regulation is that it allows for experimentation with different
approaches.408 When one state finds an effective solution, others can follow.409 When a state
chooses an approach that does not work, it affects fewer people than would a federal law.410 And
states can learn from the mistakes made in other states.
Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that state legislatures cannot react quickly
enough to remedy ineffective attempts at stemming predatory lending practices, and may
therefore cut off the flow of legitimate credit to their states. However, experience has shown that
state legislatures have been able to react quickly. For example, when state law threatened to
restrict the availability of credit in Georgia, the legislature acted quickly to revise the law.411
Today state legislatures are more able to react quickly and responsively to state concerns.
New or amended constitutions in many states now permit annual sessions of the legislature and

407

See Nice, supra note 406, at 408; Wright et al., supra note 406, at 989.

408

See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States
as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).
409

For example, North Carolina’s predatory lending statute has been emulated, and the
assignee liability provisions of Georgia’s law have been copied. See supra notes 122 and 138
and accompanying text.
410

Georgia legislators obviously felt that they had made a mistake in the original statute,
but only the people of Georgia were affected and only for a short time. See supra notes 135-36
and accompanying text.
411

See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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have removed limits on the length of sessions.412 Legislators have higher salaries and
professional staffs available to assist them,413 providing legislatures with more adequate
resources to react to state needs and the desires of their constituents.

2.

Law Enforcement

Federal law enforcement has been very successful in prosecuting the largest predatory
lending offenders,414 but states are more effective in prosecuting local and smaller actors.415 It is
unlikely that the FTC or the Federal Reserve Board would prosecute small, localized mortgage
bankers and mortgage brokers. They are simply too small to attract the attention of these large
federal actors who will generally allocate their resources to the larger offenders. Yet it is very
often the local mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, and contractors that are at the root of the
predatory lending problem.416 State attorneys general and local officials on the other hand are
equipped to prosecute the small actors. Also, state and federal governments can more effectively
work together if the hands of state and local officials are not tied.

3.

Federal Law as a Minimum Standard

412

See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF
STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 45-49 (1985), cited in Schill, supra note 400 at 1306.
413

See Schill, supra note 400, at 1307 (citing Alan Rosenthal, The Legislative Institution:
Transformed and at Risk, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 69, 73-75 (Carl E. Van Horn, ed. 1989)
and JEFFREY R. HENIG, PUBLIC POLICY AND FEDERALISM 40 (1985)).
414

See supra notes 12-15 and 100-03 and accompanying text.

415

See HUD/TREASURY, supra note 26, at 83.

416

See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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The tradition of federal law in the areas of real estate finance and consumer protection
has been to set the minimum standard.417 HOEPA was enacted in this tradition, and states have
been free to set higher standard. Thus, some state legislatures have felt a need to protect their
residents by enacting additional and stronger measures. Other state legislatures have enacted
state law with the same level of protection as HOEPA, while still others have not acted at all.418
A stronger federal law as minimum standard would eliminate the need for individual
states to act. However, a significantly stronger federal law is unlikely in today’s political
climate.419 One proposed bill before Congress would weaken HOEPA, while at the same time
expressly preempting state predatory lending laws.420 If Congress continues to set a low
minimum standard, then states should be free to act. If Congress wants uniformity, then it needs
to set a higher bar.

C.

“Onerous” Provisions of State Statutes

One of the objections that proponents of preemption have to state predatory lending
statutes is that their terms are too burdensome for lenders.421 Advocates for the subprime lending

417

See supra subpart A.

418

See supra Part II.B.

419

Congress recently enacted a Bankruptcy Reform bill that is not favorable to debtors.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
420

See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.

421

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President,
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of
Mortgage Brokers).
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industry argue that borrowers should have the option to choose a prepayment penalty provision
in order to get a lower interest rate,422 and that yield spread premiums should not be included in
the trigger for determining a high cost loan because the fees benefit homeowners.423 They argue
that homeowners should have more choices while ignoring the reality that the unsophisticated
homeowners who fall victim to predatory lenders do not have the bargaining power or the
understanding to make meaningful choices.
Critics of state regulation of predatory lending are particularly opposed the extension of
liability to assignees of predatory loans.424 With regard to the issue of assignee liability, the
experiences of Georgia and New Jersey are instructive. When liability for assignees went too
far, the rating agencies would not rate securities, so lenders would not lend. But under Georgia’s
current regime of assignee liability, as well as in New Jersey, the rating agencies have continued
to rate securities, and lenders have continued to lend.
Creation of assignee liability is one of the most effective means of dealing with predatory
lenders. The parties that buy and securitize mortgage loans are involved in multiple transactions,
while consumers are not. Consumers cannot simply go to another lender after a bad experience
with the first, but the parties who purchase loans to securitize them or hold them in portfolio can.
Also, investors can and do protect themselves with buyback provisions. As a result, purchasers
of mortgage loans on the secondary market are the parties best equipped to police the originators.
422

See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable

Lending).
423

See id. at 6 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable
Lending), 3 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers).
424

See id. at 8 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable
Lending), 4 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, The Bond Market Ass’n).
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Assertions of the need for uniformity may simply be a smoke screen for those who
simply want lower standards of consumer protection.425 The conservative lawmakers who are
pushing for federal preemption are the same lawmakers who would usually champion states
rights and favor state law over federal law. The current Republican-dominated Congress has
shown itself more likely to adopt measures that are not as consumer-friendly as some states.
Preemption of state law is therefore one way to support lending interests and ensure a low level
of consumer protection. The result, of course, is that predatory lending practices continue with
little effective curtailment.

D.

Availability of Credit

425

See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).
If uniformity in predatory lending laws is desirable, then another approach is through
uniform state law. Through the uniform law adoption process, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws can consider the views of the various interest groups.
They can also consider the success and failure of various state approaches. With a uniform act
available, state legislatures can still be flexible and responsive to the needs of their constituents
by making changes to the uniform act or by not adopting it at all.
Attempts to promulgate broad uniform statutes covering real estate finance have not been
effective. No state adopted either the Uniform Land Transactions Act adopted by NCCUSL in
1974 or the Uniform Land Security Interest Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1985. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 670. In 2002, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act. It has yet to be adopted in any state. More limited attempts at reform have
been effective, however, with states adopting uniform acts relating to condominiums and risk of
loss in real estate contracts. See id., at 91. A uniform act regulating predatory lending practices
might be an effective means for making the law more uniform while preserving the ability of
states to be responsive to their citizens. A disadvantage would be the lengthy time frame that
drafting and adoption would require.
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Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that they will reduce the amount of
subprime credit available.426 It is true that measures addressing predatory lending keep some
loans from being made. However, some loans simply should not be made because their terms
are too onerous or unfair. In some cases, the borrower could obtain a loan on better terms from a
legitimate subprime lender. However, if the borrower cannot repay the loan, the borrower
should not be extended the credit. In the legitimate subprime lending market, A- borrowers
typically pay interest rates that are about a half of a percent higher than prime borrowers. C and
D borrowers pay interest rates as much as four percent above prime rates.427 Lenders who
charge much higher interest rates on a fully secured home mortgage loans are simply taking
advantage of borrowers.
Furthermore, critics of state predatory lending statutes have not provided evidence that
the statutes have in fact reduced the availability of legitimate subprime credit. In fact, North
Carolina proves otherwise. Since the North Carolina statute became effective in 2000, subprime
loans have remained available, while the incidence of predatory loans and loans with unfair
terms has decreased.428 Certainly, the proponents of federal preemption who seek to remove
state control over local predatory lending problems have the burden to prove that the state
statutes do in fact affect the availability of subprime credit.
426

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President,
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of
Mortgage Brokers).
427

See HUD/TREASURY, supra note 26, at 28.

428

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes,
CEO, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending). See also notes 121-25 and
accompanying text.
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E.

Efficiency Concerns

Proponents of federal preemption assert that the mortgage market cannot operate
efficiently with a patchwork of state requirements.429 Lenders argue that it is too burdensome for
them to comply with different requirements in each state. They argue that the cost of compliance
will increase the cost of credit or make it unavailable.
These concerns are not valid for two reasons. First, because origination is a local
function, the originator can and should be responsible for compliance with local law. Secondly,
originators and investors in mortgage loans are already required to comply with a patchwork of
state laws, so the cost of additional state law restrictions should not be overestimated.

1.

Horizontal Segmentation of the Mortgage Market Makes Compliance
With State Law More Practical

Unlike earlier times, when mortgage markets were local, today’s mortgage market is a
national, or even international market. Today the market is not segmented by locale, but rather
by function, with the ownership and investment functions existing separately from origination
and servicing. While capital comes into the mortgage market at a national level, origination is
still primarily a local function. Most mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers have offices in the
markets in which they operate, particularly in the subprime market.

429

See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of Steve Nadon,
Chairman, Coalition for Fair & Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President,
The Bond Market Ass’n), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect of the Nat’l Ass’n of
Mortgage Brokers).
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An investor in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities does not have to know how to
comply with local law, but can leave that function to the originator.430 Since most predatory
lending issues arise at origination, it is appropriate that the originator, typically with a local
office, be charged with state law compliance. Purchasers of mortgages can and do protect
themselves with buy back requirements –requirements that the originator buy back any loans that
do not meet certain standards. So losses related to non-compliance with state law occur only
when the originator is judgment proof or bankrupt. Ultimately, purchasers of mortgages can
protect themselves by carefully selecting the originators with whom they do business.431

2.

Lenders Already Comply With Varying State Requirements

Because real estate finance law has always been to a great extent state law, a patchwork
of state law already exists. States differ in their mortgage theory,432 in the availability of and
requirements for pre-foreclosure remedies,433 in the type of foreclosure permitted,434 in the
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Servicers also must comply with local law, but at a different stage of the process. Most
predatory lending issues arise at origination.
431

This is one approach that Freddie Mac has used in its efforts to combat predatory
lending. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
432

Three theories of mortgages exist in the United States–title theory, lien theory and
intermediate theory. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages–Problems in Possession, Rents, and
Mortgage Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1961). In title theory states a mortgage lender is
treated as having title, in a sense, to the mortgaged property. Id. In lien theory states a
mortgage lender is treated as having only a security interest in the mortgaged property and may
not take possession until after foreclosure. Id. In intermediate theory states a mortgage lender
has a hybrid interest. which gives the lender the right to possession of the property after a
default under the mortgage. Id. The majority of states are lien theory states. See GRANT S.
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.2 (4th ed. 2001).
433

In title theory states, the lender has the right, in theory, to possess the property at the
time the borrower executes the mortgage. As a practical matter, however, borrowers retain
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logistics of power of sale foreclosure where it is permitted,435 in the availability of a
deficiency,436 and in the availability and means of statutory redemption after foreclosure.437 As a
result, loan documents vary greatly from state to state. Closing practices also vary greatly from
state to state with loan closings typically handled by title companies in some states, by lenders in
other states, and by attorneys in still other states.438
Since lenders must already deal with this patchwork of laws and practices in the various
states, adding requirements under a predatory lending statute is not as onerous is it would seem.
Lenders must already have separate loan documents, disclosure documents, closing

possession until default by agreement with the lender. See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432,
§ 4.1; see also Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 183, § 26 (giving the borrower a statutory right to
possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the contrary). In intermediate theory
states, the lender has the right to possession of the property after a default. Kratovil, supra note
432, at 4-5. In lien theory states, the lender may only take possession after foreclosure. Id. at 56. However, many lien theory states permit the lender to take possession of the property after
default by agreement with the borrower. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115
P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Sav. Ass’n v. Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Central
Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 U.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P.
481, 483 (Utah 1926).
States differ in the requirements that a lender must meet in order to obtain the
appointment of a receiver, NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432, § 4.33, and in the effect given
an assignment of rents, Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as
Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349, 361-62 (1993).
434

About thirty states permit power of sale foreclosure, while the rest permit only judicial
foreclosure. See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 432, § 7.19.
435

See id. States vary greatly in their requirements for notice of a foreclosure sale, with
variations including the method of notice, the notice period, and the parties who must be given
notice. See id.
436

See id. § 8.1. Some states prohibit a deficiency judgment under certain circumstances,
while others limiting the amount of the deficiency. See id. § 8.3.
437

More than half of the jurisdictions have statutory redemption, but the specifics of the
various statutes vary greatly. Id. § 8.4.
438

See NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 147, at 244.
89

requirements, and closing practices for each state in which they do business. Therefore, adding
an additional state law variable should not increase the cost to the extent that proponents of
preemption claim.
Evidence exists that interest rates are relatively insensitive to the variation in state
mortgage law.439 Additional protection for mortgagors under state law does not increase interest
rates to the extent that critics have proposed.440 Therefore, it is difficult to support preemption of
state law considering the longstanding tradition of state law in the areas of real estate and
consumer protection and considering the advantages offered by giving states autonomy over
protecting their residents.

F.

The Role of Federally-Supported Lenders
1.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently operate within the patchwork of state
laws for real estate finance and the new predatory lending laws, the GSEs have been criticized
for their failure to “lead the market” in loans to low-income families and in low-income
neighborhoods.441 Indeed, the GSEs should expand their role in leading the market by
purchasing more than just A- subprime loans. A large majority of subprime borrowers fall into
the A- category anyway, substantially fewer into the B category, and fewer still in the C and D

439

See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1991).
440

See id.

441

See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
90

categories.442 Therefore, a small presence in supporting loans in these lower categories will have
a larger impact on the markets for these loans.
In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can lead the market by creating standards for
subprime loans. One of the roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in promoting the smooth
operation of housing finance market has been to create sets of forms for home mortgage lenders
to use in the various states.443 In the prime market, even lenders who do not intend to sell their
loans to the GSEs tend to use these forms because the uniformity makes their loans more
marketable on the secondary market.444 In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created
automated underwriting systems for the prime market and more recently for A- subprime
loans.445 The GSEs can further their goal of leading the market by producing forms for subprime
loans that comply with the patchwork of predatory lending laws and by creating underwriting
standards for subprime lending.

2.

Federally Chartered Banks and Thrifts

442

“The National Home Equity Mortgage Association reports that the “A-minus” segment
makes up 60 percent, the “B” segment 30 percent, the “C” segment 9 percent, and the “D”
segment 1 percent of the market. Inside B&C Lending reports that the “A-minus” segment
makes up 73 percent, the “B” segment 13 percent, the “C” segment 9 percent, and the “D”
segment 5 percent of the market.” HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 26, at 34 (citing
Correspondents Reign Supreme in 1999, INSIDE B&C LENDING, Mar. 10, 2000).
443

See http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/;
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/.
444

See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44
U.C.L.A. L.REV. 951, 971 (1997).
445

KENNETH TEMKIN, JENNIFER E. H. JOHNSON, DIANE LEVY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, FOR
U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES,
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Banks and thrifts argue that they have not been part of the predatory lending problem and
should therefore be exempt from state laws. While few banks may have been directly involved
in originating predatory loans, they have been involved through affiliates, by purchasing
predatory loans and securities backed by predatory loans, and by financing predatory lenders.446
Further, it is likely that current federal regulations preempting banks and their operating
subsidiaries from the operation of state predatory lending laws will make it easier for banks to be
involved in predatory lending. For example, banks can now move their subprime lending
operations into operating subsidiaries to avoid the operation of state law, and banks themselves
can purchase or take security interests in predatory loans without fear of the assignee liability
provisions of state law.
Theoretically, the OCC will be monitoring banks to prevent predatory lending abuses, but
the OCC may not have the resources to monitor activities of national banks and their operating
subsidiaries. The OCC’s primary responsibility is to monitor the safety and soundness of
national banks and their affiliates.447 The agency is responsible for more than 1900 national
banks448 and in 2003 could not provide a list of their operating subsidiaries because “the number
and names of the operating subsidiaries were constantly changing.”449 Today the OCC maintains

AND RISK-BASED PRICING

vii, 21 (2002), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf.
446

See supra notes 321-37 and accompanying text.

447

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm.
448

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks Active As of 9/30/05,
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/foia/nblist_Name_St_City_BankNet.pdf.
449

NCLC Comments, supra note 24, at 13 n.26.
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a list on its website of “many of the national bank operating subsidiaries that do business directly
with consumers.”450 In October 2005, the list included the names of more than 300
companies,451 but it is constantly changing because bank holding companies reorganize their
holdings on a relatively frequent basis.452 Furthermore, the agency may not have the motivation
to find and prosecute predatory lending abuses in the ranks of the institutions it regulates because
its funding comes primarily from the assessments on the banks it regulates rather than from
Congress.453
The OCC’s preemption of state law is truly a “race to the bottom.”454 By providing the
most lenient regime for regulating predatory lending practices, the OCC can encourage national
banks to keep their federal charters and state banks to switch to federal charters.455 Because the
OCC’s budget is funded primarily by large national banks whose interests are served by the
preemption rule, the OCC can ensure the preeminence of the national banking system.456 This is
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further evidence that the OCC will have little incentive to prosecute predatory lending abuses
among these institutions.
Banks and thrifts should be a part of the solution rather than being part of the problem.
They should be subject to state consumer protection laws as the GSEs have been. Because banks
and thrifts receive the benefit of the federal safety net, they have a special obligation to the
public. They and their affiliates should be subject to the same standards as other lenders.

VII.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the federal government should not preempt state predatory lending laws

either through regulations applicable only to federally chartered banks and thrifts or through
legislation applicable to all lenders. Real estate finance and consumer protection have
traditionally been areas governed by state law, and where the federal government has intervened
in these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for
consumer protection rather than preempting the field of regulation. When state governments
regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and can be innovative in
trying new solutions. Further, state enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in
predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.
Varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim. Since subprime
loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, they can comply
with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase only from those that
comply with local law. The states already have varying requirements for real estate finance, so
adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and standards that already vary
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from state to state. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory goals
of leading the market in loans to low-income families and in low-income neighborhoods by
creating standards that originators can use to comply with each state’s law and by purchasing
more subprime loans, including loans to subprime borrowers with less than A- credit.
Banks, thrifts, and their affiliates have not earned the special treatment that they receive
under new regulations. Furthermore, the OCC does not have the resources or motivation to
regulate national banks and their operating subsidiaries to the extent they should be regulated.
Congress should override the OCC and OTS determinations that their regulations preempt state
predatory lending laws.
Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been inadequate and
unsuccessful. The federal government should not make the problem worse by tying the hands of
state legislatures and state attorney generals who are tying to combat the problem. Federal
preemption, where state laws are more restrictive, simply adds fuel to the fire by insulating
predatory lenders from effective oversight and sanctions. The federal government must stop
mortgaging the American dream.
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